happen, and 2 to fail, then the
fraction 3/5 will fairly
represent the prob
ability of its
happening, and may be taken to
be the
measure of it.
The same may be said of the prob
ability of failing, which will
likewise be
measured by a
fraction whose numerator is the number
of chances
whereby it may fail, and the denominator the whole
number of chances both for its
happening and failing; thus the
prob
ability of the failing of that event which has 2 chances to
fail and 3 to happen will be
measured by the
fraction 2/5.
The
fractions which represent the probabilities of
happening and
failing, being added together, their sum will always be equal to
unity, since the sum of their numerators will be equal to their
common denominator. Now, it being a
certainty that an event will
either happen or fail, it follows that
certainty, which may be
conceived under the notion of an
infinitely great degree of
prob
ability, is fitly represented by unity.
These things will be easily apprehended if it be considered that
the word prob
ability includes a double idea; first, of the number
of chances
whereby an event may happen;
secondly, of the number
of chances
whereby it may either happen or fail. If I say that I
have three chances to win any sum of money, it is impossible from
the bare
assertion to judge whether I am likely to
obtain it; but
if I add that the number of chances either to
obtain it or miss
it, is five in all, from this will ensue a
comparison between the
chances that are for and against me,
whereby a true judgment will
be formed of my prob
ability of success;
whence it necessarily
follows that it is the
comparativemagnitude of the number of
chances to happen, in respect of the whole number of chances
either to happen or to fail, which is the true
measure of
prob
ability.
To find the prob
ability of throwing an ace in two throws with a
single die. The prob
ability of throwing an ace the first time is
1/6;
whereof 1/ is the first part of the prob
ability required.
If the ace be missed the first time, still it may be thrown on
the second; but the prob
ability of
missing it the first time is
5/6, and the prob
ability of throwing it the second time is 1/6;
therefore the prob
ability of
missing it the first time and
throwing it the second, is 5/6 X 1/6 = 5/36 and this is the
second part of the prob
ability required, and
therefore the
prob
ability required is in all 1/6 + 5/36 = 11/36.
To this case is analogous a question
commonly proposed about
throwing with two dice either six or seven in two throws, which
will be easily solved, provided it be known that seven has 6
chances to come up, and six 5 chances, and that the whole number
of chances in two dice is 36; for the number of chances for
throwing six or seven 11, it follows that the prob
ability of
throwing either chance the first time is 11/36, but if both are
missed the first time, still either may be thrown the second
time; but the prob
ability of
missing both the first time is
25/36, and the prob
ability of throwing either of them on the
second is 11/36;
therefore the prob
ability of
missing both of
them the first time, and throwing either of them the second time,
is 25/36 X 11/36 = 275/1296, and
therefore the prob
abilityrequired is 11/36 + 275/1296 = 671/1296, and the prob
ability of
the
contrary is 625/1296.
Among the many mistakes that are committed about chances, one of
the most common and least suspected was that which
related to
lotteries. Thus,supposing a
lotterywherein the
proportion of
the blanks to the prizes was as five to one, it was very natural
to conclude that,
therefore, five tickets were
requisite for the
chance of a prize; and yet it is demonstrable that four tickets
were more than sufficient for that purpose. In like manner,
supposing a
lottery in which the
proportion of the blanks to the
prize is as thirty-nine to one (as was the
lottery of 1710), it
may be proved that in twenty-eight tickets a prize is as likely
to be taken as not, which, though it may
contradict the common
notions, is
nevertheless grounded upon
infallible demonstrations.
When the Play of the Royal Oak was in use, some persons who lost
considerably by it, had their losses
chiefly occasioned by an
argument of which they could not
perceive the fallacy. The odds
against any particular point of the ball were one and thirty to
one, which entitled the adventurers, in case they were winners,
to have thirty-two stakes returned, including their own; instead
of which, as they had but twenty-eight, it was very plain that,