19. A new Reason of the Disuse of the Salic and Roman Laws, as also of the Capitularies. I have already mentioned the reasons that had destroyed the authority of the Salic and Roman laws, as also of the Capitularies; here I shall add that the principal cause was the great extension given to judiciary combats.

　　As the Salic laws did not admit of this custom, they became in some measure useless, and fell into oblivion, In like manner the Roman laws, which also rejected this custom, were laid aside; their whole attention was then taken up in establishing the law of judicialcombats, and in forming a proper digest of the several cases that might happen on those occasions. The regulations of the Capitularies became likewise of no manner of service. Thus it is that such a number of laws lost all their authority, without our being able to tell the precise time in which it was lost; they fell into oblivion, and we cannot find any others that were substituted in their place.

　　Such a nation had no need of written laws; hence its written laws might very easily fall into disuse.

　　If there happened to be any disputes between two parties, they had only to order a single combat. For this no great knowledge or abilities were requisite.

　　All civil and criminal actions are reduced to facts. It is upon these facts they fought; and not only the substance of the affair, but likewise the incidents and imparlances were decided by combat, as Beaumanoir observes, who produces several instances.[111]

　　I find that, towards the commencement of the third race, the jurisprudence of those times related entirely to precedents; everything was regulated by the point of honour. If the judge was not obeyed, he insisted upon satisfaction from the person that contemned his authority. At Bourges, if the provost had summoned a person and he refused to come, his way of proceeding was to tell him, "I sent for thee, and thou didst not think it worth thy while to come; I demand therefore satisfaction for this thy contempt." Upon which they fought.[112] Louis the Fat reformed this custom.[113]

　　The custom of legal duels prevailed at Orleans, even in all demands of debt.[114] Louis the Young declared that this custom should take place only when the demand exceeded five sous. This ordinance was a local law; for in St. Louis' time it was sufficient that the value was more than twelve deniers.[115] Beaumanoir[116] had heard a gentleman of the law affirm that formerly there had been a bad custom in France of hiring a champion for a certain time to fight their battles in all causes. This shows that the custom of judiciary combat must have prevailed at that time to a wonderful extent.

　　20. Origin of the Point of Honour. We meet with inexplicable enigmas in the codes of laws of the Barbarians. The law of the Frisians[117] allows only half a sou in composition to a person that had been beaten with a stick, and yet for ever so small a wound it allows more. By the Salic law, if a freeman gave three blows with a stick to another freeman, he paid three sous; if he drew blood, he was punished as if he had wounded him with steel, and he paid fifteen sous: thus the punishment was proportioned to the greatness of the wound. The law of the Lombards established different compositions for one, two, three, four blows, and so on.[118] At present, a single blow is equivalent to a hundred thousand.

　　The constitution of Charlemagne, inserted in the law of the Lombards, ordains that those who were allowed the trial by combat should fight with bastons.[119] Perhaps this was out of regard to the clergy; or probably, as the usage of legal duels gained ground, they wanted to render them less sanguinary. The capitulary of Louis the Debonnaire allows the liberty of choosing to fight either with the sword or baston.[120] In process of time none but bondmen fought with the baston.[121]

　　Here I seethe first rise and formation of the particular articles of our point of honour. The accuser began by declaring in the presence of the judge that such a person had committed such an action, and the accused made answer that he lied,[122] upon which the judge gave orders for the duel. It became then an established rule that whenever a person had the lie given him, it was incumbent on him to fight.

　　Upon a man's declaring that he would fight,[123] he could not afterwards depart from his word; if he did, he was condemned to a penalty. Hence this rule ensued, that whenever a person had engaged his word, honour forbade him to recall it.

　　Gentlemen fought one another on horseback, and armed at all points;[124] villains fought on foot and with bastons.[125] Hence it followed that the baston was looked upon as the instrument of insults and affronts,[126] because to strike a man with it was treating him like a villain.

　　None but villains fought with their faces uncovered,[127] so that none but they could receive a blow on the face. Therefore, a box on the ear became an injury that must be expiated with blood, because the person who received it had been treated as a villain.

　　The several people of Germany were no less sensible than we of the point of honour; nay, they were more so. Thus the most distant relatives took a very considerable share to themselves in every affront, and on this all their codes are founded. The law of the Lombards ordains[128] that whosoever goes attended with servants to beat a man unawares, in order to load him with shame and to render him ridiculous, should pay half the composition which he would owe if he had killed him;[129] and if through the same motive he tied or bound him, he would pay three-quarters of the same composition.

　　Let us then conclude that our forefathers were extremely sensible of affronts; but that affronts of a particular kind, such as being struck with a certain instrument on a certain part of the body, and in a certain manner, were as yet unknown to them. All this was included in the affront of being beaten, and in this case the amount of violence determined the magnitude of the outrage.

　　21. A new Reflection upon the Point of Honour among the Germans. "It was a great infamy," says Tacitus,[130] "among the Germans for a person to leave his buckler behind him in battle; for which reason many after a misfortune of this kind have destroyed themselves." Thus the ancient Salic law[131] allows a composition of fifteen sous to any person that had been injuriously reproached with having left his buckler behind him.

　　When Charlemagne amended the Salic law,[132] he allowed in this case no more than three sous in composition. As this prince cannot be suspected of having had a design to enervate the military discipline, it is manifest that such an alteration was due to a change of weapons, and that from this change of weapons a great number of usages derive their origin.

　　22. Of the Manners in relation to judicial Combats. Our connections with the fair sex are founded on the pleasure of enjoyment; on the happiness of loving and being loved; and likewise on the ambition of pleasing the ladies, because they are the best judges of some of those things which constitute personal merit. This general desire of pleasing produces gallantry, which is not love itself, but the delicate, the volatile, the perpetual simulation of love.

　　According to the different circumstances of every country and age, love inclines more to one of those three things than to the other two. Now I maintain that the prevailing spirit at the time of our judicialcombats must have been that of gallantry.

　　I find in the law of the Lombards,[133] that if one of the two champions was found to have any magic herbs about him, the judge ordered them to be taken from him, and obliged him to swear he had no more. This law could be founded only on the vulgar opinion; it was fear, the alleged inventor of much that made them imagine this kind of prestige. As in single combats the champions were armed at all points, and as with heavy arms, both of the offensive and defensive kind, those of a particular temper and strength gave immense advantages, the notion of some champions having enchanted arms must certainly have turned the brains of a great many people.

　　Hence arose the marvellous system of chivalry. The minds of all sorts of people quickly imbibed these extravagant ideas, In romances are found knights-errant, necromancers, and fairies, winged or intelligent horses, invisible or invulnerable men, magicians who concerned themselves in the birth and education of great personages, enchanted and disenchanted palaces, a new world in the midst of the old one, the usual course of nature being left only to the lower class of mankind. Knights-errant ever in armour, in a part of the world abounding in castles, forts, and robbers, placed all their glory in punishing injustice, and in protecting weakness. Hence our romances are full of gallantry founded on the idea of love joined to that of strength and protection.

　　Such was the origin of gallantry, when they formed the notion of an extraordinary race of men who at the sight of a virtuous and beautiful lady in distress were inclined to expose themselves to all hazards for her sake, and to endeavour to please her in the common actions of life.

　　Our romances of chivalry flattered this desire of pleasing, and communicated to a part of Europe that spirit of gallantry which we may venture to affirm was very little known to the ancients.

　　The prodigious luxury of that immense city of Rome encouraged sensuous pleasures. The tranquillity of the plains of Greece gave rise to the description of the sentiments of love.[134] The idea of knights-errant, protectors of the virtue and beauty of the fair sex, led to that of gallantry.

　　This spirit was continued by the custom of tournaments, which, uniting the rights of valour and love, added still a considerable importance to gallantry.

　　23. Of the Code of Laws on judicial Combats. Some perhaps will have a curiosity to see this abominable custom of judiciary combat reduced to principles and to find the groundwork of such an extraordinary code of laws. Men, though reasonable in the main, reduce their very prejudices to rule. Nothing was more contrary to good sense, than those combats, and yet when once this point was laid down, a kind of prudential management was used in carrying it into execution.

　　In order to be thoroughly acquainted with the jurisprudence of those times, it is necessary to read with attention the regulations of St. Louis, who made such great changes in the judiciary order. D嶨ontaines was contemporary with that prince; Beaumanoir wrote after him,[135] and the rest lived since his time. We must, therefore, look for the ancient practice in the amendments that have been made of it.

　　24. Rules established in the judicial Combat. When there happened to be several accusers, they were obliged to agree among themselves that the action might be carried on by a single prosecutor; and, if they could not agree, the person before whom the action was brought, appointed one of them to prosecute the quarrel.[136]

　　When a gentleman challenged a villain, he was obliged to present himself on foot with buckler and baston; but if he came on horseback and armed like a gentleman, they took. his horse and his arms from him and, stripping him to his shirt, they compelled him to fight in that condition with the villain.[137]

　　Before the combat the magistrates ordered three bans to be published. By the first the relatives of the parties were commanded to retire; by the second the people were warned to be silent; and the third prohibited the giving of any assistance to either of the parties, under severe penalties, nay, even on pain of death if by this assistance either of the combatants should happen to be vanquished.[138]

　　The officers belonging to the civil magistrate[139] guarded the list or enclosure where the battle was fought; and in case either of the parties declared himself desirous of peace, they took particular notice of the actual state in which they mutually stood at that very moment, to the end that they might be restored to the same situation in case they did not come to an understanding.[140]

　　When the pledges were received either for a crime or for false judgment, the parties could not make up the matter without the consent of the lord; and when one of the parties was overcome, there could be no accommodation without the permission of the count, which had some analogy to our letters of grace.[141]

　　But if it happened to be a capital crime, and the lord, corrupted by presents, consented to an accommodation, he was obliged to pay a fine of sixty livres, and the right he had of punishing the malefactor devolved upon the count.[142]

　　There were a great many people incapable either of offering, or of accepting battle. But liberty was given them, on cause being shown, to choose a champion; and that he might have a stronger interest in defending the party in whose behalf he appeared, his hand was cut off if he lost the battle.[143]

　　When capital laws were made in the last century against duels, perhaps it would have been sufficient to have deprived a warrior of his military capacity by the loss of his hand; nothing in general being a greater mortification to mankind than to survive the loss of their character.

　　When, in capital cases, the duel was fought by champions, the parties were placed where they could not behold the battle; each was bound with the cord that was to be used at his execution in case his champion was overcome.[144] The person overcome in battle did not always lose the point contested; if, for instance, they fought on an imparlance, he lost only the imparlance.[145]

　　25. Of the Bounds prescribed to the Custom of judicial Combats. When pledges of battle had been received upon a civil affair of small importance, the lord obliged the parties to withdraw them.

　　If a fact was notorious; for instance, if a man had been assassinated in the open marketplace, then there was neither a trial by witnesses, nor by combat; the judge gave his decision from the notoriety of the fact.[146]

　　When the court of a lord had often determined after the same manner, and the usage was thus known,[147] the lord refused to grant the parties the privilege of duelling, to the end that the usages might not be altered by the different success of the combats.

　　They were not allowed to insist upon duelling but for themselves, for some one belonging to their family, or for their liege lord.[148]

　　When the accused had been acquitted, another relative could not insist on fighting him; otherwise disputes would never be terminated.[149]

　　If a person appeared again in public whose relatives, upon a supposition of his being murdered, wanted to revenge his death, there was then no room for a combat; the same may be said if by a notorious absence the fact was proved to be impossible.[150]

　　If a man who had been mortally wounded had exculpated before his death the person accused and named another, they did not proceed to a duel; but if he had mentioned nobody his declaration was looked upon as a forgiveness on his death-bed; the prosecution was continued, and even among gentlemen they could make war against each other.[151]

　　When there was a conflict, and one of the relatives had given or received pledges of battle, the right of contest ceased; for then it was thought that the parties wanted to pursue the ordinary course of justice; therefore he that would have continued the contest would have been sentenced to make good all the losses.

　　Thus the practice of judiciary combat had this advantage, that it was apt to change a general into an individual quarrel, to restore the courts of judicature to their authority, and to bring back into the civil state those who were no longer governed but by the law of nations.

　　As there are an infinite number of wise things that are managed in a very foolish manner; so there are many foolish things that are very wisely conducted.

　　When a man who was challenged with a crime visibly showed that it had been committed by the challenger himself, there could be then no pledges of battle; for there is no criminal but would prefer a duel of uncertain event to a certain punishment.[152]

　　There were no duels in affairs decided by arbiters,[153] nor by ecclesiastical courts, nor in cases relating to women's dowries.

　　"A woman," says Beaumanoir, "cannot fight." if a woman challenged a person without naming her champion, the pledges of battle were not accepted. It was also requisite that a woman should be authorised by her baron, that is, by her husband, to challenge; but she might be challenged without this authority.[154]

　　If either the challenger or the person challenged were under fifteen years of age, there could be no combat.[155] They might order it, indeed, in disputes relating to orphans when their guardians or trustees were willing to run the risk of this procedure.

　　The cases in which a bondman was allowed to fight are, I think, as follows. He was allowed to fight another bondman; to fight a freedman, or even a gentleman, in case he were challenged; but if he himself challenged, the other might refuse to fight; and even the bondman's lord had a right to take him out of the court.[156] The bondman might by his lord's charter or by usage fight with any freeman;[157] and the church claimed this right for her bondmen[158] as a mark of respect due to her by the laity.[159]

　　26. On the judiciary Combat between one of the Parties and one of the Witnesses. Beaumanoir informs us[160] that a person who saw a witness going to swear against him might elude the other by telling the judges that his adversary produced a false and slandering witness; and if the witness was willing to maintain the quarrel, he gave pledges of battle. The inquiry was no longer the question; for if the witness was overcome, it was decided that the adversary had produced a false witness, and he lost his cause.

　　It was necessary that the second witness should not be heard; for if he had made his attestation, the affair would have been decided by the deposition of two witnesses. But by staying the second, the deposition of the first witness became void.

　　The second witness being thus rejected, the party was not allowed to produce any others, but he lost his cause; in case, however, there had been no pledges of battle, he might produce other witnesses.

　　Beaumanoir observes[161] that the witness might say to the party he appeared for, before he made his deposition: "I do not care to fight for your quarrel, nor to enter into any debate; but if you are willing to stand by me, I am ready to tell the truth." The party was then obliged to fight for the witness, and if he happened to be overcome, he did not lose his cause,[162] but the witness was rejected.

　　This, I believe, was a modification of the ancient custom; and what makes me think so is that we find this usage of challenging the witnesses established in the laws of the Bavarians[163] and Burgundians[164] without any restriction.

　　I have already made mention of the constitution of Gundebald, against which Agobard[165] and St. Avitus[166] made such loud complaints. "When the accused," says this prince, "produces witnesses to swear that he has not committed the crime, the accuser may challenge one of the witnesses to a combat; for it is very just that the person who has offered to swear, and has declared that he was certain of the truth, should make no difficulty of maintaining it by combat." Thus the witnesses were deprived by this king of every kind of subterfuge to avoid the judiciary combat.