selves than to their enemies. So rapid was the conflagration, that the

French in their official account say, the hull, the masts, and sails,
all seemed to take fire at the same moment; and though the English boats

were put out to the assistance of the poor wretches on board, not more
than 200 could be saved. The AGAMEMNON, and Captain Rowley in the

CUMBERLAND, were just getting into close action a second time, when the
admiral called them off, the wind now blowing directly into the Gulf of

Frejus, where the enemy anchored after the evening closed.
Nelson now proceeded to his station with eight sail of frigates under

his command. Arriving at Genoa, he had a conference with Mr. Drake, the
British envoy to that state; the result of which was, that the object of

the British must be to put an entire stop to all trade between Genoa,
France, and the places occupied by the French troops; for unless this

trade were stopped, it would be scarcely possible for the allied armies
to hold their situation, and impossible for them to make any progress in

driving the enemy out of the Riviera di Genoa. Mr. Drake was of opinion
that even Nice might fall for want of supplies, if the trade with Genoa

were cut off. This sort of blockade Nelson could not carry on without
great risk to himself. A captain in the navy, as he represented to the

envoy, is liable to prosecution for detention and damages. This danger
was increased by an order which had then lately been issued; by which,

when a neutral ship was detained, a complete specification of her cargo
was directed to be sent to the secretary of the Admiralty, and no legal

process instituted against her till the pleasure of that board should be
communicated. This was requiring an impossibility. The cargoes of ships

detained upon this station, consisting chiefly of corn, would be spoiled
long before the orders of the Admiralty could be known; and then, if

they should happen to release the vessel, the owners would look to the
captain for damages. Even the only precaution which could be taken

against this danger, involved another danger not less to be apprehended:
for if the captain should direct the cargo to be taken out, the freight

paid for, and the vesselreleased, the agent employed might prove
fraudulent, and become bankrupt; and in that case the captain became

responsible. Such things had happened: Nelson therefore required, as the
only means for carrying on that service, which was judged essential to

the common cause, without exposing the officers to ruin, that the
British envoy should appoint agents to pay the freight, release the

vessels, sell the cargo, and hold the amount till process was had upon
it: government thus securing its officers. "I am acting," said

Nelson. "not only without the orders of my commander-in-chief, but, in
some measure, contrary to him. However, I have not only the support of

his Majesty's ministers, both at Turin and Genoa, but a consciousness
that I am doing what is right and proper for the service of our king and

country. Political courage, in an officer abroad, is as highly necessary
as military courage."

This quality, which is as much rarer than military courage as it is
more valuable, and without which the soldier's bravery is often of

little avail, Nelson possessed in an eminent degree. His representations
were attended to as they deserved. Admiral Hotham commended him for

what he had done; and the attention of government was awakened to the
injury which the cause of the alliescontinually suffered from the

frauds of neutralvessels. "What changes in my life of activity!" said
the indefatigable man. "Here I am, having commenced a co-operation with

an old Austrian general, almost fancying myself charging at the head of
a troop of horse! I do not write less than from ten to twenty letters

every day; which, with the Austrian general and aides-de-camp, and my
own little squadron, fully employ my time. This I like; active service

or none." It was Nelson's mind which supported his feeble body through
these exertions. He was at this time almost blind, and wrote with very

great pain. "Poor AGAMEMNON" he sometimes said, "was as nearly worn out
as her captain; and both must soon be laid up to repair."

When Nelson first saw General de Vins, he thought him an able man,
who was willing to act with vigour. The general charged his inactivity

upon the Piedmontese and Neapolitans, whom, he said, nothing could
induce to act; and he concerted a plan with Nelson for embarking a part

of the Austrian army, and landing it in the rear of the French. But the
English commodore soon began to suspect that the Austrian general was

little disposed to any active operations. In the hope of spurring him
on, he wrote to him, telling him that he had surveyed the coast to the

W. as far as Nice, and would undertake to embark 4000 or 5000 men, with
their arms and a few days' provisions, on board the squadron, and land

them within two miles of St. Remo, with their field-pieces. Respecting
further provisions for the Austrian army, he would provide convoys, that

they should arrive in safety; and if a re-embarkation should be found
necessary, he would cover it with the squadron. The possession of St.

Remo, as headquarters for magazines of every kind, would enable the
Austrian general to turn his army to the eastward or westward. The enemy

at Oneglia would be cut off from provisions, and men could be landed to
attack that place whenever it was judged necessary. St. Remo was the

only place between Vado and Ville Franche where the squadron could lie
in safety, and anchor in almost all winds. The bay was not so good as

Vado for large ships; but it had a mole, which Vado had not, where all
small vessels could lie, and load and unload their cargoes. This bay

being in possession of the allies, Nice could be completely blockaded by
sea. General de Vins affecting, in his reply, to consider that Nelson's

proposal had no other end than that of obtaining the bay of St. Remo as
a station for the ships, told him, what he well knew, and had expressed

before, that Vado Bay was a better anchorage; nevertheless, if
MONSIEUR LE COMMANDANT NELSON was well assured that part of the fleet

could winter there, there was no risk to which he would not expose
himself with pleasure, for the sake of procuring a safe station for the

vessels of his Britannic Majesty. Nelson soon assured the Austrian
commander that this was not the object of his memorial. He now began to

suspect that both the Austrian Court and their general had other ends in
view than the cause of the allies. "This army," said he, "is slow beyond

all description; and I begin to think that the Emperor is anxious to
touch another L4,000,000 of English money. As for the German generals,

war is their trade, and peace is ruin to them; therefore we cannot
expect that they should have any wish to finish the war. The politics of

courts are so mean, that private people would be ashamed to act in the
same way; all is trick and finesse, to which the common cause is

sacrificed. The general wants a loop-hole; it has for some time
appeared to me that he means to go no further than his present position,

and to lay the miscarriage of the enterprise against Nice, which has
always been held out as the great object of his army, to the non-co-

operation of the British fleet and of the Sardinians."
To prevent this plea, Nelson again addressed De Vins, requesting only

to know the time, and the number of troops ready to embark; then he
would, he said, dispatch a ship to Admiral Hotham, requesting

transports, having no doubt of obtaining them, and trusting that the
plan would be successful to its fullest extent. Nelson thought at the

time that, if the whole fleet were offered him for transports, he would
find some other excuse; and Mr. Drake, who was now appointed to reside

at the Austrian headquarters, entertained the same idea of the general's
sincerity. It was not, however, put so clearly to the proof as it ought

to have been. He replied that, as soon as Nelson could declare himself
ready with the vessels necessary for conveying 10,000 men, with their

artillery and baggage, he would put the army in motion. But Nelson was
not enabled to do this: Admiral Hotham, who was highly meritorious in

leaving such a man so much at his own discretion, pursued a cautious
system, ill according with the bold and comprehensive views of Nelson,

who continually regretted Lord Hood, saying that the nation had suffered
much by his resignation of the Mediterranean command. The plan which had

been concerted, he said, would astonish the French, and perhaps the
English.

There was no unity in the views of the allied powers, no cordiality
in their co-operation, no energy in their councils. The neutral powers

assisted France more effectually than the allies assisted each other.
The Genoese ports were at this time filled with French privateers,

which swarmed out every night, and covered the gulf; and French vessels
were allowed to tow out of the port of Genoa itself, board vessels which

were coming in, and then return into the mole. This was allowed without
a remonstrance; while, though Nelson abstained most carefully from