to the want of assistance from the AGAMEMNON. Had the force for which
Nelson applied been given him, he could have attended to both objects;

and had he been permitted to attack the convoy in Alassio, he would have
disconcerted the plans of the French, in spite of the Austrian general.

He had foreseen the danger, and pointed out how it might be prevented;
but the means of preventing it were withheld. The attack was made as

he foresaw; and the gun-boats brought their fire to bear upon the
Austrians. It so happened, however, that the left flank, which was

exposed to them, was the only part of the army that behaved well: this
division stood its ground till the centre and the right wing fled, and

then retreated in a soldierlike manner. General de Vins gave up the
command in the middle of the battle, pleading ill health. "From that

moment," says Nelson, "not a soldier stayed at his post: it was the
devil take the hindmost. Many thousands ran away who had never seen the

enemy; some of them thirty miles from the advanced posts. Had I not,
though I own, against my inclination, been kept at Genoa, from 8000 to

10,000 men would have been taken prisoners, and, amongst the number,
General de Vins himself; but by this means the pass of the Bocchetta was

kept open. The purser of the ship, who was at Vado, ran with the
Austrians eighteen miles without stopping; the men without arms,

officers without soldiers, women without assistance. The oldest officers
say they never heard of so complete a defeat, and certainly without any

reason. Thus has ended my campaign. We have established the French
republic: which but for us, I verily believe, would never have been

settled by such a volatile, changeable people. I hate a Frenchman: they
are equally objects of my detestation whether royalists or republicans:

in some points, I believe, the latter are the best." Nelson had a
lieutenant and two midshipmen taken at Vado: they told him, in their

letter, that few of the French soldiers were more than three or four and
twenty years old, a great many not more than fourteen, and all were

nearly naked; they were sure, they said, his barge's crew could have
beat a hundred of them; and that, had he himself seen them, he would not

have thought, if the world had been covered with such people, that they
could have beaten the Austrian army.

The defeat of General de Vins gave the enemy possession of the
Genoese coast from Savona to Voltri, and it deprived the Austrians of

their direct communication with the English fleet. The AGAMEMNON,
therefore, could no longer be useful on this station, and Nelson sailed

for Leghorn to refit. When his ship went into dock, there was not a
mast, yard, sail, or any part of the rigging, but what stood in need of

repair, having been cut to pieces with shot. The hull was so damaged
that it had for some time been secured by cables, which were served or

thrapped round it.
CHAPTER IV

1796 - 1797
Sir J. Jervis takes the Command--Genoa joins the French--Bounaparte

begins his Career--Evacuation of Corsica--Nelson hoists his broad
Pennant in the MINERVE--Action with the SABINA--Battle off Cape St.

Vincent--Nelson commands the inner Squadron at the Blockade of Cadiz
Boat Action in the Bay of Cadiz--Expedition against Teneriffe--Nelson

loses an Arm--His Sufferings in England, and Recovery.
*

SIR JOHN JERVIS had now arrived to take the command of the
Mediterranean fleet. The AGAMEMNON having, as her captain said, been

made as fit for sea as a rotten ship could be, Nelson sailed from
Leghorn, and joined the admiral in Fiorenzo Bay. "I found him," said

he, "anxious to know many things which I was a good deal surprised to
find had not been communicated to him by others in the fleet; and it

would appear that he was so well satisfied with my opinion of what is
likely to happen, and the means of prevention to be taken, that he had

no reserve with me respecting his information and ideas of what is
likely to be done." The manner in which Nelson was received is said to

have excited some envy. One captain observed to him: "You did just as
you pleased in Lord Hood's time, the same in Admiral Hotham's, and now

again with Sir John Jervis: it makes no difference to you who is
commander-in-chief." A higher compliment could not have been paid to any

commander-in-chief than to say of him that he understood the merits of
Nelson, and left him, as far as possible, to act upon his own judgment.

Sir John Jervis offered him the ST.GEORGE, ninety, or the ZEALOUS,
seventy-four, and asked if he should have any objection to serve under

him with his flag. He replied, that if the AGAMEMNON were ordered home,
and his flag were not arrived, he should, on many accounts, wish to

return to England; still, if the war continued, he should be very proud
of hoisting his flag under Sir John's command, "We cannot spare you,"

said Sir John, "either as captain or admiral." Accordingly, he resumed
his station in the Gulf of Genoa. The French had not followed up their

successes in that quarter with their usual celerity. Scherer, who
commanded there, owed his advancement to any other cause than his merit:

he was a favourite of the directory; but for the present, through the
influence of Barras, he was removed from a command for which his

incapacity was afterwards clearly proved, and Buonaparte was appointed
to succeed him. Buonaparte had given indications of his military

talents at Toulon, and of his remorseless nature at Paris; but the
extent either of his ability or his wickedness was at this time known to

none, and perhaps not even suspected by himself.
Nelson supposed, from the information which he had obtained, that one

column of the French army would take possession of Port Especia; either
penetrating through the Genoese territory, or proceeding coast-ways in

light vessels; our ships of war not being able to approach the coast,
because of the shallowness of the water. To prevent this, he said; two

things were necessary: the possession of Vado Bay, and the taking of
Port Especia; if either of these points were secured, Italy would be

safe from any attack of the French by sea. General Beaulieu, who had now
superseded De Vins in the command of the allied Austrian and Sardinian

army, sent his nephew and aide-de-camp to communicate with Nelson, and
inquire whether he could anchor in any other place than Vado Bay. Nelson

replied, that Vado was the only place where the British fleet could lie
in safety, but all places would suit his squadron; and wherever the

general came to the sea-coast, there he should find it. The Austrian
repeatedly asked, if there was not a risk of losing the squadron? and

was constantly answered, that if these ships should be lost, the admiral
would find others. But all plans of co-operation with the Austrians were

soon frustrated by the battle of Montenotte. Beaulieu ordered an attack
to be made upon the post of Voltri. It was made twelve hours before the

time which he had fixed, and before he arrived to direct it. In
consequence, the French were enabled to effect their retreat, and fall

back to Montenotte, thus giving the troops there a decisive superiority
in number over the division which attacked them. This drew on the defeat

of the Austrians. Buonaparte, with a celerity which had never before
been witnessed in modern war, pursued his advantages; and, in the course

of a fortnight, dictated to the court of Turin terms of peace, or rather
of submission; by which all the strongest places of Piedmont were put

into his bands.
On one occasion, and only on one, Nelson was able to impede the

progress of this new conqueror. Six vessels, laden with cannon and
ordnance-stores for the siege of Mantua, sailed from Toulon for St. Pier

d'Arena. Assisted by Captain Cockburn, in the MELEAGER, he drove them
under a battery" target="_blank" title="n.炮兵连；炮台；电池">battery; pursued them, silenced the batteries, and captured the

whole. Military books, plans and maps of Italy, with the different
points marked upon them where former battles had been fought, sent by

the directory for Buonaparte's use, were found in the convoy. The loss
of this artillery was one of the chief causes which compelled the French

to raise the siege of Mantua; but there was too much treachery, and too
much imbecility, both in the councils and armies of the allied powers,

for Austria to improve this momentary success. Buonaparte perceived
that the conquest of Italy was within his reach; treaties, and the

rights of neutral or of friendly powers, were as little regarded by him
as by the government for which he acted. In open contempt of both he

entered Tuscany, and took possession of Leghorn. In consequence of this
movement, Nelson blockaded that port, and landed a British force in the

Isle of Elba, to secure Porto Ferrajo. Soon afterwards he took the
Island of Capraja, which had formerly belonged to Corsica, being less

than forty miles distant from it; a distance, however, short as it was,