to the want of
assistance from the AGAMEMNON. Had the force for which
Nelson
applied been given him, he could have attended to both objects;
and had he been permitted to attack the convoy in Alassio, he would have
disconcerted the plans of the French, in spite of the Austrian general.
He had
foreseen the danger, and
pointed out how it might be prevented;
but the means of preventing it were
withheld. The attack was made as
he foresaw; and the gun-boats brought their fire to bear upon the
Austrians. It so happened, however, that the left flank, which was
exposed to them, was the only part of the army that behaved well: this
division stood its ground till the centre and the right wing fled, and
then
retreated in a soldierlike manner. General de Vins gave up the
command in the middle of the battle, pleading ill health. "From that
moment," says Nelson, "not a soldier stayed at his post: it was the
devil take the hindmost. Many thousands ran away who had never seen the
enemy; some of them thirty miles from the
advanced posts. Had I not,
though I own, against my
inclination, been kept at Genoa, from 8000 to
10,000 men would have been taken prisoners, and,
amongst the number,
General de Vins himself; but by this means the pass of the Bocchetta was
kept open. The purser of the ship, who was at Vado, ran with the
Austrians eighteen miles without stopping; the men without arms,
officers without soldiers, women without
assistance. The oldest officers
say they never heard of so complete a defeat, and certainly without any
reason. Thus has ended my
campaign. We have established the French
republic: which but for us, I
verily believe, would never have been
settled by such a volatile,
changeable people. I hate a Frenchman: they
are
equally objects of my detestation whether royalists or republicans:
in some points, I believe, the latter are the best." Nelson had a
lieutenant and two midshipmen taken at Vado: they told him, in their
letter, that few of the French soldiers were more than three or four and
twenty years old, a great many not more than fourteen, and all were
nearly naked; they were sure, they said, his barge's crew could have
beat a hundred of them; and that, had he himself seen them, he would not
have thought, if the world had been covered with such people, that they
could have
beaten the Austrian army.
The defeat of General de Vins gave the enemy possession of the
Genoese coast from Savona to Voltri, and it deprived the Austrians of
their direct
communication with the English fleet. The AGAMEMNON,
therefore, could no longer be useful on this station, and Nelson sailed
for Leghorn to refit. When his ship went into dock, there was not a
mast, yard, sail, or any part of the rigging, but what stood in need of
repair, having been cut to pieces with shot. The hull was so damaged
that it had for some time been secured by cables, which were served or
thrapped round it.
CHAPTER IV
1796 - 1797
Sir J. Jervis takes the Command--Genoa joins the French--Bounaparte
begins his Career--Evacuation of Corsica--Nelson hoists his broad
Pennant in the MINERVE--Action with the SABINA--Battle off Cape St.
Vincent--Nelson commands the inner Squadron at the Blockade of Cadiz
Boat Action in the Bay of Cadiz--Expedition against Teneriffe--Nelson
loses an Arm--His Sufferings in England, and Recovery.
*
SIR JOHN JERVIS had now arrived to take the command of the
Mediterranean fleet. The AGAMEMNON having, as her captain said, been
made as fit for sea as a
rotten ship could be, Nelson sailed from
Leghorn, and joined the
admiral in Fiorenzo Bay. "I found him," said
he, "anxious to know many things which I was a good deal surprised to
find had not been
communicated to him by others in the fleet; and it
would appear that he was so well satisfied with my opinion of what is
likely to happen, and the means of
prevention to be taken, that he had
no reserve with me
respecting his information and ideas of what is
likely to be done." The manner in which Nelson was received is said to
have excited some envy. One captain observed to him: "You did just as
you pleased in Lord Hood's time, the same in Admiral Hotham's, and now
again with Sir John Jervis: it makes no difference to you who is
commander-in-chief." A higher
compliment could not have been paid to any
commander-in-chief than to say of him that he understood the merits of
Nelson, and left him, as far as possible, to act upon his own judgment.
Sir John Jervis offered him the ST.GEORGE, ninety, or the ZEALOUS,
seventy-four, and asked if he should have any
objection to serve under
him with his flag. He replied, that if the AGAMEMNON were ordered home,
and his flag were not arrived, he should, on many accounts, wish to
return to England; still, if the war continued, he should be very proud
of hoisting his flag under Sir John's command, "We cannot spare you,"
said Sir John, "either as captain or
admiral." Accordingly, he resumed
his station in the Gulf of Genoa. The French had not followed up their
successes in that quarter with their usual celerity. Scherer, who
commanded there, owed his
advancement to any other cause than his merit:
he was a favourite of the directory; but for the present, through the
influence of Barras, he was removed from a command for which his
incapacity was afterwards clearly proved, and Buonaparte was ap
pointedto succeed him. Buonaparte had given indications of his military
talents at Toulon, and of his remorseless nature at Paris; but the
extent either of his
ability or his wickedness was at this time known to
none, and perhaps not even suspected by himself.
Nelson
supposed, from the information which he had obtained, that one
column of the French army would take possession of Port Especia; either
penetrating through the Genoese territory, or
proceeding coast-ways in
light
vessels; our ships of war not being able to approach the coast,
because of the shallowness of the water. To prevent this, he said; two
things were necessary: the possession of Vado Bay, and the
taking of
Port Especia; if either of these points were secured, Italy would be
safe from any attack of the French by sea. General Beaulieu, who had now
superseded De Vins in the command of the
allied Austrian and Sardinian
army, sent his
nephew and aide-de-camp to
communicate with Nelson, and
inquire whether he could
anchor in any other place than Vado Bay. Nelson
replied, that Vado was the only place where the British fleet could lie
in safety, but all places would suit his
squadron; and
wherever the
general came to the sea-coast, there he should find it. The Austrian
repeatedly asked, if there was not a risk of losing the
squadron? and
was
constantly answered, that if these ships should be lost, the
admiralwould find others. But all plans of co-operation with the Austrians were
soon frustrated by the battle of Montenotte. Beaulieu ordered an attack
to be made upon the post of Voltri. It was made twelve hours before the
time which he had fixed, and before he arrived to direct it. In
consequence, the French were enabled to effect their
retreat, and fall
back to Montenotte, thus giving the troops there a
decisive superiority
in number over the division which attacked them. This drew on the defeat
of the Austrians. Buonaparte, with a celerity which had never before
been witnessed in modern war, pursued his
advantages; and, in the course
of a
fortnight, dictated to the court of Turin terms of peace, or rather
of
submission; by which all the strongest places of Piedmont were put
into his bands.
On one occasion, and only on one, Nelson was able to
impede the
progress of this new
conqueror. Six
vessels, laden with
cannon and
ordnance-stores for the siege of Mantua, sailed from Toulon for St. Pier
d'Arena. Assisted by Captain Cockburn, in the MELEAGER, he drove them
under a
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battery; pursued them, silenced the
batteries, and captured the
whole. Military books, plans and maps of Italy, with the different
points marked upon them where former battles had been fought, sent by
the directory for Buonaparte's use, were found in the convoy. The loss
of this
artillery was one of the chief causes which compelled the French
to raise the siege of Mantua; but there was too much
treachery, and too
much imbecility, both in the councils and armies of the
allied powers,
for Austria to improve this
momentary success. Buonaparte perceived
that the
conquest of Italy was within his reach; treaties, and the
rights of
neutral or of friendly powers, were as little regarded by him
as by the government for which he acted. In open
contempt of both he
entered Tuscany, and took possession of Leghorn. In
consequence of this
movement, Nelson
blockaded that port, and landed a British force in the
Isle of Elba, to secure Porto Ferrajo. Soon afterwards he took the
Island of Capraja, which had
formerly belonged to Corsica, being less
than forty miles distant from it; a distance, however, short as it was,