（注：本试卷参考答案及解析见《2008年考研英语模拟试卷part.2(参考答案及解析)》）

Section I Use of English

Part A

Directions: Read the following text. Choose the best word(s) for each numbered blank and mark A,B,C or D on ANSWER SHEET 1.(10 points)

The basic function of money is the enable buying to be separated from selling, thus permitting trade to take place without the so-called double coincidence of barter. If a person has something to sell and wants something else ＿1＿ return, it is not necessary to search for someone able and ＿2＿to make the desired exchange of items. The person can sell the ＿3＿ item for general purchasing power-that is, "money"-to anyone who wants to buy it and then use the proceeds to buy the desired item from anyone who wants to sell it.

The importance of this function of money is ＿4＿ illustrated by the experience of Germany just after World War Ⅱ, ＿5＿ paper money was ＿6＿ largely useless because, despite inflationary conditions, price controls were effectively ＿7＿ by the American, French, and British armies of occupation. People had to ＿8＿ to barter or to inefficient money substitutes. The result was to cut total output of the economy in half. The German "economic miracle" just after 1948 reflected partly a currency reform by the occupation authorities, ＿9＿ some economists hold that it stemmed primarily from the German government's ＿10＿ of all price controls, ＿11＿ permitting a money economy to ＿12＿ a barter economy.

＿13＿ of the act of sale from the act of purchase ＿14＿ the existence of something that will be generally accepted in payment-this is the "＿15＿ of exchange" function of money. But there must also be something that can serve as a ＿16＿ abode of purchasing power, in which the seller holds the proceeds in the interim ＿17＿ the first sale and the ＿18＿ purchase, or from which the buyer can ＿19＿ the general purchasing power with which to pay ＿20＿ what is bought. This is the "asset" function of money.

1.

［A］ on

［B］ in

［C］ by

［D］ for

2.

［A］ capable

［B］ likely

［C］ desirable

［D］ willing

3.

［A］ excess

［B］ extra

［C］ surplus

［D］ ample

4.

［A］ dramatically

［B］ urgently

［C］ faithfully

［D］ incidentally

5.

［A］ when

［B］ before

［C］ since

［D］ until

6.

［A］ developed

［B］ reserved

［C］ rendered

［D］ imagined

7.

［A］ encouraged

［B］ enlarged　　

［C］ endured

［D］ enforced

8.

［A］ conform

［B］ resort　　

［C］ commit　　

［D］ gear

9.

［A］ and

［B］ but

［C］ therefore

［D］ however

10.

［A］ deprivation

［B］ stimulation　

［C］ elimination

［D］ restriction

11.

［A］ thereby

［B］ therefore

［C］ then

［D］ while

12.

［A］ alternate

［B］ establish

［C］ substitute

［D］ replace

13.

［A］ Introduction

［B］ Specification

［C］ Representation 　　

［D］ Separation

14.

［A］ assumes

［B］ requires

［C］ focuses

［D］ undertakes

15.

［A］ medium

［B］ function 　

［C］ role

［D］ nature

16.

［A］ fashionable

［B］ favorable

［C］ temporary 　

［D］ token

17.

［A］ both 　

［B］ for 　

［C］ between 　　

［D］ after

18.

［A］ consequent

［B］ relevant

［C］ inadequate

［D］ subsequent

19.

［A］ execute 　

［B］ extract 　

［C］ exceed 　

［D］ exchange

20.

［A］ for 　

［B］ off 　

［C］ back 　　

［D］ in

Section Ⅱ Reading Comprehension

Part A

Directions:

Read the following four texts. Answer the questions below each text by choosing A, B, C or D. Mark your answers on ANSWER SHEET 1. (40 points)

Text 1

Two related paradoxes also emerge from the same basic conception of the aesthetic experience. The first was given extended consideration by Hegel, who argued roughly as follows: our sensuous attention and that gives to the work of art its peculiar individuality. Because it addresses itself to our sensory appreciation, the work of art is essentiallyconcrete, to be understood by an act of perception rather than by a process of discursive thought.

At the same time, our understanding of the work of art is in part intellectual" title="n.知识分子">intellectual; we seek in it a conceptual content, which it presents to us in the form of an idea. One purpose of criticalinterpretation is to expound this idea in discursive form-to give the equivalent of the content of the work of art in another, nonsensuous idiom. But criticism can never succeed in this task, for, by separating the content from the particular form, it abolishes its individuality. The content presented then ceases to be the exact content of that work of art. In losing its individuality, the content loses its aesthetic reality; it thus ceases to be a reason for attending to the particular work and that first attracted our critical attention. It cannot be this that we saw in the original work and that explained its power over us.

For this content, displayed in the discursive idiom of the criticalintellect, is no more than a husk, a discarded relic of a meaning that eluded us in the act of seizing it. If the content is to be the true object of aesthetic interest, it must remain wedded to its individuality: it cannot be detached from its "sensuous embodiment" without being detached from itself. Content is, therefore, inseparable from form and form in turn inseparable from content. (It is the form that it is only by virtue of the content that it embodies.)

Hegel's argument is the archetype of many, all aimed at showing that it is both necessary to distinguish form from content and also impossible to do so. This paradox may be resolved by rejecting either of its premises, but, as with Kant's antinomy, neither premise seems dispensable. To suppose that content and form are inseparable is, in effect, to dismiss both ideas as illusory, since no two works of art can then share either a content or a form-the form being definitive of each work's individuality.

In this case, no one could ever justify his interest in a work of art by reference to its meaning. The intensity of aesthetic interest becomes a puzzling, and ultimatelyinexplicable, feature of our mental life. If, on the other hand, we insist that content and form are separable, we shall never be able to find, through a study of content, the reason for attending to the particular work of art that intrigues us. Every work of art stands proxy for its paraphrase. An impassable gap then opens between aesthetic experience and its ground, and the claim that aesthetic experience is intrinsically valuable is thrown in doubt.

21. Hegel argued that .

［A］ it is our sensuous appreciation that gives peculiar individuality to the work of art

［B］ it is the content of the work of art that holds our attention

［C］ the work of art cannot be understood without a process of logical thinking

［D］ the form of the work of art is what our sensuous appreciation concentrates on

22. It can be inferred from this passage that .

［A］ the paradox that it is both necessary to distinguish form content and also impossible to do so cannot be resolved by rejecting its premises

［B］ both content and form of the work of art are illusory

［C］ the content and form of the work of art are separable

［D］ aesthetic experience is not intrinsically valuable

23. Which of the following is NOT what Hegel believed?

［A］ The content and form of the work of art cannot be separated from each other.

［B］ The content of the work of art is always the true object of aesthetic interest.

［C］ The content presented without any individuality is not the content of the work of art.

［D］ The content understood by means of a process of discursive thought is no more than a husk.

24. Premises that are related to each other seems to be dispensable because .

［A］ Kant thinks they are indispensable

［B］ either of them can resolve the paradox

［C］ the premises are separated

［D］ the premises can account for the theory

25. This passage is mainly about .

［A］ the sensuous appreciation of art

［B］ the basic conception of the aesthetic experience

［C］ how to appreciate the work of art

［D］ the relationship between form and content of the work of art

Text 2

Every country with a monetary system of its own has to have some kind of market in which dealers in bills, notes, and other forms of short term credit can buy and sell. The"money market" is a set of institutions or arrangements for handling what might be called wholesale transactions in money and short term credit. The need for such facilities arises in much the same way that a similar need does in connection with the distribution of any of the products of a diversified economy to their final users at the retail level. If the retailer is to provide reasonably adequate service to his customers, he must have active contacts with others who specialize in making or handling bulk quantities of whatever is his stock in trade. The money market is made up of specialized facilities of exactly this kind. It exists for the purpose of improving the ability of the retailers of financial services-commercial banks, savings institutions, investment houses, lending agencies, and even governments-to do their job. It has little if any contact with the individuals or firms who maintain accounts with these various retailers or purchase their securities or borrow from them.

The elemental functions of a money market must be performed in any kind of modern economy, even one that is largely planned or socialist, but the arrangements in socialist countries do not ordinarily take the form of a market. Money markets exist in countries that use market processes rather than planned allocations to distribute most of their primary resources among alternative uses. The general distinguishing feature of a money market is that it relies upon open competition among those who are bulk suppliers of funds at any particular time and among those seeking bulk funds, to work out the best practicable distribution of the existing total volume of such funds.

In their market transactions, those with bulk supplies of funds or demands for them, rely on groups of intermediaries who act as brokers or dealers. The characteristics of these middlemen, the services they perform, and their relationship to other parts of the financial vary widely from country to country. In many countries there is no single meeting place where the middlemen get together, yet in most countries the contacts among all participants are sufficiently open and free to assure each supplier or user of funds that he will get or pay a price that fairly reflects all of the influences (including his own) that are currently affecting the whole supply and the whole demand. In nearly all cases, moreover, the unifying force of competition is reflected at any given moment in a common price (that is, rate of interest) for similar transactions. Continuous fluctuations in the money market rates of interest result from changes in the pressure of available supplies of funds upon the market and in the pull of current demands upon the market.

26. The first paragraph is mainly about .

A. the definition of money market

B. the constitution of a money market

C. the basic functions of a money market

D. the general feature of a money market

27. According to this passage, the money market .

A. provides convenient services to its customers

B. has close contact with the individuals or firms seeking funds

C. maintains accounts with various retailers of financial services

D. is made up of institutions who specialize in handling wholesalemonetary transactions

28. Which of the following statements concerning money market is not true according to this passage?

A. Money market does not exist in planned economies.

B. Money market has been established in some socialist countries.

C. Money market encourages open competition among bulk suppliers of funds.

D. Money market relies upon market processes to distribute funds to final users.

29. The author uses the example of middleman to show .

A. market transactions are important in different countries

B. dealers are needed in doing business

C. middlemen can play great role in different transactions and different countries.

D. middlemen in different countries have different actions in business.

30. According to this passage, .

A. brokers usually perform the same kinds of services to their customers

B. brokers have little contact with each other

C. open competition tends to result in a common price for similar transactions at any given moment

D. changes in the pressure of available supplies of funds upon market tends to maintain a common price for similar transactions

Text 3

Environmental issues raise a host of difficult ethical questions, including the ancient one of the nature of intrinsic value. Whereas many philosophers in the past have agreed that human experiences have intrinsic value and the utilitarians at least have always accepted that the pleasures and pains of nonhuman animals are of some intrinsic significance, this does not show why it is so bad if dodos become extinct or a rain forest is cut down. Are these things to be regretted only because of the loss to humans or other sentient creatures? Or is there more to it than that? Some philosophers are now prepared to defend the view that trees, rivers, species (considered apart from the individual animals of which they consist), and perhaps ecological systems as a whole have a value independent of the instrumental value they may have for humans or other sentient creatures.

Our concern for the environment also raises the question of our obligations to future generations. How much do we owe to the future? From a social contract view of ethics or for the ethical egoist, the answer would seem to be: nothing. For we can benefit them, but they are unable to reciprocate. Most other ethical theories, however, do give weight to the interests of coming generations. Utilitarians, for one, would not think that the fact that members of future generations do not exist yet is any reason for giving less consideration to their interests than we give to our own, provided only that we are certain that they will exist and will have interests that will be affected by what we do. In the case of, say, the storage of radioactive wastes, it seems clear that what we do will indeed affect the interests of generations to come.

The question becomes much more complex, however, when we consider that we can affect the size of future generations by the population policies we choose and the extent to which we encourage large or small families. Most environmentalists believe that the world is already dangerously overcrowded. This may well be so, but the notion of overpopulation conceals a philosophical issue that is ingeniously explored by Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons (1984). What is optimum population? Is it that population size at which the average level of welfare will be as high as possible? Or is it the size at which the total amount of welfare-the average multiplied by the number of people-is as great as possible? Both answers lead to counterintuitive outcomes, and the question remains one of the most baffling mysteries in appliedethics.



31. The first paragraph is mainly about .

［A］ the intrinsic value of human experiences

［B］ the intrinsic value of the experiences of nonhuman animals

［C］ the intrinsic value of ecological system as a whole

［D］ an ancient ethical question about the nature of intrinsic value