杰里米·格兰瑟姆(Jeremy Grantham)拥有不容小觑的从业纪录─他成功地预言了互联网泡沫,接着又成功地预言了房地产泡沫。虽说这样的纪录为这位著名的预测大师赢得了"永远的熊市论者"(perma-bear)的绰号,他也曾在2009年初告诉GMO资产管理公司的客户杀回市场。就在那一周,股市正好创下了雷曼公司(Lehman)倒闭后的历史低位。GMO资产管理公司的总部位于波士顿,管理的资产总额为1,000亿美元。
JEREMY GRANTHAM'S GOT A TRACK RECORD that's impossible to ignore--he called the Internet bubble, then the housing bubble. While moves like those have earned the famed forecaster the
nickname 'perma-bear,' in early 2009 he also told clients at GMO, his $100 billion, Boston-based money-management firm, to jump back into the market. It was the same week that stocks hit their post-Lehman low.
不过现在这位坦率直言的约克郡人、GMO的首席投资策略师,再次用最新的预测抓住了媒体的眼球:他发出马尔萨斯式的悲惨警告,称可能出现环境大灾难。他的观点主要是:世界的食品供应即将告罄;资源的价格只会越变越贵;气候变化迫在眉睫。的确,格兰瑟姆有时候听起来像极了绿色和平组织派出去的拿着材料挨家挨户宣传的工作人员。(他未能免俗地将煤炭业的宣传比作是戈培尔的造势之作)。如果换成别人,华尔街很可能对此一笑置之。但因为他是杰里米·格兰瑟姆,华尔街很可能就会变得洗耳恭听。
Now, however, the outspoken Yorkshireman, who is chief
investment strategist at GMO, is making headlines with a new prediction: Dire, Malthusian warnings about environmental catastrophe. To hear him tell it, the world is
running out of food. Resources will only keep getting more expensive. And
climate change looms over it all. Indeed, at times he sounds like someone Greenpeace would send door-to-door with a clipboard. (He's not above likening the coal-industry spin to the handiwork of Goebbels.) If it were anyone else, Wall Street would probably laugh him off. But because it's Jeremy Grantham, they just might listen.
问:对于大宗商品的价格,你一直都在敲响警钟。你为什么会产生这种担忧?
Q: You've been ringing alarm bells about
commodity prices. Why all the worry?
答:大宗商品的价格在一百年内平均下降了70%,而在2002年前后,大宗商品的价格却出现了井喷式的增长,基本上每种大宗商品的价格都涨到了原来的三倍──我的意思是,几乎没有例外。我认为烟草是唯一价格下降的大宗商品。大宗商品将一百年跌去的价格都涨回来了,而且是在02年至08年的六年间就涨回来了。游戏规则已经改变了。我猜测,游戏改变的原因是中国奇高的增长率──中国是如此庞大的国家,13亿人口消费了全球45%的煤炭、50%的水泥和40%的铜。我的意思是,这些数据不可能持续下去而不导致一些事情失控。
A: They came down for a hundred years by an average of 70 percent, and then starting around 2002, they shot up and basically everything tripled--and I mean, everything. I think
tobacco was the only one that went down. They've given back a hundred years of price decline and they gave it back between '02 and '08, in six years. The game has changed. I
suspect the game changed because of the
ridiculous growth rates in China--such a large country, with 1.3
billion people using 45 percent of the coal used in the world, 50 percent of all the
cement and 40 percent of all the copper. I mean these are numbers that you can't keep on rolling along without expecting something to go tilt.
问:这会令人得出一些意想不到的结论,比如你对于自然资源的担忧。而大多数人还没有听说过这些担忧。
Q: This led to some
surprising conclusions, like your concerns about natural resources most of us have
barely heard of.
答:我们对资源逐一进行了研究,我们认为最重要、最有意义以及最严峻的问题是磷酸盐或磷的问题。磷不能经由人工生产,只能自然存储。对于所有的生物来讲,磷都不可或缺。随着我们对磷的开采,这种原材料正在逐渐枯竭。我想说的是,如果这都不能令你感到恐惧的话,那你可比我坚强。这是一个可怕的等式(开采多少,储量就减少多少)。所以,我去向教授们讨教,问他们未来将会怎样。他们说:"哦!磷矿的储量非常丰富。"但是,当磷矿枯竭后又会怎么样呢?"哦,它的储量非常丰富。"这是一个相当无力的论据。我们的确拥有大量磷矿,但是85%开采成本低廉、品质较高的磷矿都位于摩洛哥......并归摩洛哥国王所有。我的意思是,这是一种微妙的状况。相较于历史上原油在中东最集中的程度,磷矿的集中程度要高得多;并且从长远来说,磷矿的重要性也高得多。如果实施有节制开采的话,全球其他地区的磷矿储备或许可以再支撑50年。
A: We went through one by one, and we
decided the most important, the most
valuable and the most
critical was
phosphate or phosphorous. Phosphorous cannot be made, only placed. It is necessary for all living things. And we are
mining it, and it's depleting. And I like to say, if that doesn't give you goosebumps, then you're tougher than me. That is a terrible equation. So I went to the professors, and I said, what's going to happen, and they said, 'Oh, there's plenty of phosphorous.' But what's going to happen when it runs out? 'Oh, there is plenty.' It's a really weak argument. We do have a lot, but 85 percent of the low-cost, high-quality phosphorous is in Morocco...and belongs to the King of Morocco. I mean, this is an odd situation. Much, much more constrained than oil in the Middle East ever was--and much more important in the end. And the rest of the world has maybe 50 years of reserve if we don't grow too fast.
Q: What are investors
supposed to do?
答:这对投资的潜在启示就是:要拥有地下储藏的东西,拥有重要的资源,不论是磷、钾、原油、铜、锡还是锌─还可以继续数下去。我对铝和铁矿石没有那么高的热情,就因为这两种矿产储备太丰富了。我也不会持有煤炭和含油砂。建造采煤设施非常昂贵,开采含油砂需要建设的设施也规模庞大。我怀疑远在投资方收回成本前,太阳能和风能的价格就已然大幅回落。
A: The
investment implications are, of course, own stock in the ground, own great resources, reserves of phosphorous, potash, oil, copper, tin, zinc--you name it. I'd be less
enthusiastic about
aluminum and iron ore just because there is so much. And I wouldn't own coal, and I wouldn't own tar sands. It's hugely
expensive to build coal utilities, and the plants they have to build for tar sands are massive, and before they get their money back I
suspect that the price of solar and wind will have come down so much.
所以我不会投资煤炭和含油砂,但是我会投资于原油、金属,特别是肥料─以及比所有这些都重要的粮食。当前,粮食压力比其它各方面的压力都大。那么,解决方案是什么呢?是精耕细作,而这完全可以实现。从投资者的角度来看,重点在于优质的耕地。耕地价格已经涨了很多。你当然不能忽视价格和价值,但是你可以不时地找到不错的耕地投资机会。如果你已经准备好了投资海外市场的话,那么你今天就可以出手了。我本人不愿冒太大风险。我会选择那些非常稳定的国家─比如澳大利亚、新西兰、乌拉圭、巴西、加拿大,当然还有美国。但是,我也会考虑一下那些称作"被遗忘角落"的国家。林业也是如此。林业投资不是会让你吃亏的生意,或许它的价格有点虚高,但是别忘了,我们正处于一个几乎每件东西都价格虚高的世界。不得不说,这都是不可思议的低利率所赐。这是美国联邦储备委员会不道德的伎俩。
So I wouldn't use that, but I think oil, the metals and particularly the fertilizers, I would own--and the most important of all is food. The pressures on food are worse than anything else, and therefore, what is the solution? Very good farming, which can be done. The
emphasis from an investor's point of view is on very good farmland. It's had a big run. You can never afford to
ignore price and value, but from time to time you can get good investments in farmland, and if you're prepared to go abroad, you can do it today. I wouldn't be too risky. I would stay with
distinctlystable countries--Australia, New Zealand, Uruguay, Brazil, Canada, of course, and the U.S. But I would look around, in what I call the nooks and crannies. And forestry is the same. Forestry is not a bad bargain, a little overpriced maybe, but it's in a world where everything is overpriced today, once again,
courtesy of
incredibly low interest rates that push people into investing. A
wicked plot of the Federal Reserve.
问:为什么这个问题让我们如此难以应对?你一直抨击短期行为。
Q: Why is this problem so hard for us to deal with? You've railed against short-termism.
答:职业政客的眼界是非常短浅的。他们并不真正关心那些五年或十年之后会出现的问题。第二,还有一个贴现率效应的问题,也就是说,对企业来说,十年之后1美元的价值要远低于今天的1美元。所以,从企业层面上讲,他们最关注短期效应。而政治家关心的是更短时期内的效应。此外,还有既得利益效应。换句话说,当从现状中获益匪浅的人不想改变现状的时候,改变就变得非常困难。如果石油行业正赚得盆满钵满───事实也是如此──他们就不想改变现状去建立一个关注气候变化及征收碳排放税的系统。他们可能资助右翼智库,事实上,他们也是这样做的。
A: A
careerpolitician has a very short horizon. They're not really interested in problems that go out five or 10 years. Secondly, you have what they call the discount-rate effect, which is a dollar in 10 years has a much lower value to a
corporation than a dollar today. So they're only interested, at the corporate level, in the short term. And politicians, in the very short term. And you have a vested-interest effect. In other words, it's very hard to get change when the people who are benefitting very nicely, thank you, from the current situation don't want it. If the oil industry is making a bundle, which they are, they don't want to change to a
system that recognizes
climate change and the need to have a tax on carbon. And they can fund right-wing think tanks, and they do.
所以既得利益获得者会奋不顾身地保持现状。这是亘古不变的真理。因此,改变是困难的,再加上我们的政治家面临短期竞选的问题,改变几乎是不可能完成的任务。政治家对竞选献金极度依赖,而且他们发现竞选献金大多来自金融界等既得利益集团,特别是能源行业,在这种情况下,就会出现血淋淋的奇迹:什么事情都可以做。
So you have vested interests fighting like mad to keep the situation the way it is. And that's always the case. So change is difficult, and with our politicians with the short-term
election problems, it's nearly impossible. And when they depend so much on
campaign contributions, and they find the
campaign contributions come so much from the vested interests, the
financial world, but more particularly the
energy world, it's a
bloodymiracle anything gets done.
问:长期展望非常重要,不仅对社会的改变是如此,对投资来讲也一样。作为一名投资人,您的眼光已经是众所周知。
Q: And that long-term
perspective is important, not only to changing society, but also to investing. As an investor, you're known for that.
答:我想指出我觉得是最核心的关注点,在股市中那就是耐心、价值和均值回归,在社会范畴中则是资源和气候灾害。需要做的还有很多,而这些则是重中之重。在股市中,人们关注的时间周期短暂得令人震惊,这在互联网泡沫中就可见一斑。人们对社会问题关注的时间周期也同样短得令人震惊,大家希望听到的无非是增长速度将有多快,以及万事都是多么地遂愿。
A: I like to get what I consider the central idea, which in the stock market is
patience and value and mean reversion. And in society, it is resources and
climate damage. That's plenty to go on, and that's a pretty strong focus. We have a shockingly short
horizon in the stock market, as witnessed in the Internet bubble. And we have a shockingly short
horizon about social problems, where all we want to hear is how rapid the growth will be and how good everything is.
问:您对股市作何展望?您成功地预测了股市在2009年初的涨势,但是到了2010年,您又预测股市将出现"七年不景气"。然而,到目前为止,股市却一再走高。
Q: How about a stock forecast. You called the market's
initial 2009 rally, but by 2010 you were predicting 'seven lean years.' So far, however, the market's soared.
答:在美联储的推动下,股指可能还会冲得更高。我们可能将迎来另一个真正的泡沫。基于美联储的历史,泡沫似乎是美联储愿意看到的景象。大家知道,我们在2000年格林斯潘掌舵时经历过一次泡沫;托贝南克(Bernanke)和格林斯潘的福,我们随后又迎来了房地产泡沫和金融泡沫。看起来,贝南克现在非常乐于将利率维持在低位并坐视股票价格飙升。他们这样做的原因是,股票价格走高给你带来些许消费的刺激,让你感觉自己更富有了。接着,当你最不希望事情发生变化时,整个形势突然间变得对你不利了,股票价格回归至均值甚至更低的水平,正像股市09年的情形一样。消费者作出反应,于是就出现了衰退和熊市。但是,尽管我们已经遭遇了两次泡沫,美联储似乎决心迎接第三次泡沫。就像我说的,这种希望种豆得瓜的做法符合"疯狂"的定义。
A: And it can go a lot higher than this with the Fed pushing it. And we can have another real bubble. Based on the Fed's history, that seems to be what they like. You know we had one in 2000 with Greenspan, and then we had a housing
bubble and a
financialbubble with Bernanke and Greenspan. And it looks like Bernanke is
perfectly happy to keep the rates down and watch as stock prices rise. They do that because as the rising stock prices give you a little
consumer kick, you feel richer--and then, when you least need it, the whole thing bites you, and the prices go back to fair price or lower, like they did in '09, and the
consumer reacts, and you have a recession and a bad stock market. But they've had two of these, and they seem bound and determined to do it a third time. As I've said, it's a workable
definition of
madness to keep doing the same thing and expect a different result.
问:与许多英国人一样,您似乎认为美国人是过于盲目乐观的。
Q: Like many Englishmen, you seem to regard Americans as wildly, fool-heartedly optimistic.
答:美国是一个非常、非常具有乐观倾向的社会;顺便提一下,我认为澳大利亚也是如此。美国和澳大利亚是两大乐观主义国家。当你在英国谈及房地产泡沫问题时,英国人会说:"哦?真的吗?让我看看数据。"当你在澳大利亚提出同样的问题时,第三次世界大战便会由此爆发。他们将对你恨之入骨。并且在几年之内都不会原谅你[笑]。只是因为你暗示他们可能正面临房地产泡沫。[笑]
A: America is a very, very optimistic-biased society, as I believe, incidentally, Australia is, for
whatever that means. We're the two great optimistic societies. You can have a conversation about a housing
bubble in England, and they'll say, 'oh, is that right? Let me see the data.' If you have one in Australia, you have World War III! They hate you. They hate you for years! [laughs] The idea that you could suggest that they were having a housing bubble. [laughs]
问:所以这个关于美国人的固有印象是真的?
Q: So the stereotypes about us are true?
答:千真万确。乐观对企业、风险资本以及初创企业一直都非常有帮助。在美国,失败的案例可能比其它所有发达国家加起来还要多,但是结果是,当尘埃落定之时,亚马逊(Amazon)和谷歌(Google)这样的企业却应运而生。这不是一种偶然现象。我们只是向圆靶投出了更多飞镖而已。德国人对于投掷飞镖非常保守。我们则拥有令人敬佩的冒险精神,和对失败极高的容忍度。
A: Absolutely. Now, it's been very useful in enterprise, in
venture capital...in start-ups. We have more failures here than probably every developed country added together, but in consequence, when the smoke clears, we tend to end up with the Amazons and the Googles. It's not an accident. We just throw more darts at the dartboard. The Germans are very
conservative about throwing darts. We have an
admirable risk-taking attitude, and we're very
tolerant of failure.
问:这点对美国人有益吗?
Q: We benefit from it?
答:绝对有益,不过也有不足之处,那就是你是认为自己会成功才愿意投掷飞镖的。美国企业家都认为自己会成功。虽然只有10%的企业能够生存下来,但所有企业家都会认为自己会取得成功。
A: Absolutely, but the downside is you're
willing to throw darts because you think you're going to win. American entrepreneurs all know they're going to win. Only 10 percent survive, but they all think they're going to win.