《War And Peace》　Book2 　CHAPTER XIV
　　　　by Leo Tolstoy

KUTUZOV had, on the 1st of November, received from one of his spies
information that showed the army he commanded to be in an almost hopeless
position. The spy reported that the French, after crossing the bridge at Vienna,
were moving in immense force on Kutuzov's line of communications with the
reinforcements marching from Russia. If Kutuzov were to determine to remain at
Krems, Napoleon's army of a hundred and fifty thousand men would cut him off
from all communications, and would surround his exhausted army of forty
thousand, and he would find himself in the position of Mack before Ulm. If
Kutuzov decided to leave the road leading to a junction with the Russian
reinforcements, he would have to make his way with no road through unknown
country to the mountains of Bohemia, pursued by the cream of the enemy's forces,
and to give up all hope of effecting a junction with Buxhevden. If Kutuzov
decided to march by the road from Krems to Olmätz to join the forces from Russia
he ran the risk of finding the French, who had crossed the Vienna bridge, in
advance of him on this road, and so being forced to give battle on the march,
encumbered with all his stores and transport, with an enemy three times as
numerous and hemming him in on both sides. Kutuzov chose the last course.

The French, after crossing the river, had, as the spy reported, set off at a
quick march toward Znaim, which lay on Kutuzov's line of routes more than a
hundred versts in front of him. To reach Znaim before the French offered the
best hopes of saving the army. To allow the French to get to Znaim before him
would mean exposing the whole army to a disgrace like that of the Austrians at
Ulm, or to complete destruction. But to arrive there before the French with the
whole army was impossible. The road of the French army from Vienna to Znaim was
shorter and better than the Russians' road from Krems to Znaim.

On the night of receiving the news Kutuzov sent Bagration's advance guard of
four thousand soldiers to the right over the mountains from the Krems-Znaim road
to the Vienna and Znaim road. Bagration was to make a forced march, to halt
facing towards Vienna and with his back to Znaim, and if he succeeded in getting
on the road in advance of the French, he was to delay them as long as he could.
Kutuzov himself with all the transport was making straight for Znaim.

Bagration marched forty-five versts, by night in stormy weather, through the
mountains, with no road, and with hungry, barefoot soldiers. Leaving a third of
his men straggling behind him, Bagration reached Hollabrunn, on the Vienna and
Znaim road, a few hours before the French, who marched upon Hollabrunn from
Vienna. Kutuzov needed fully another twenty-four hours to get to Znaim with all
the transport, and so to save the army Bagration would have had, with his four
thousand hungry and exhausted soldiers, to have kept at bay the whole army of
the enemy confronting him at Hollabrunn for four-and-twenty hours, and this was
obviously impossible. But a freak of fate made the impossible possible. The
success of the trick that had given the Vienna bridge into the hands of the
French encouraged Murat to try and take in Kutuzov too. Murat, on meeting
Bagration's weak detachment on the Znaim road, supposed it to be the whole army
of Kutuzov. To give this army a final and crushing defeat he waited for the
troops still on the road from Vienna, and to that end he proposed a truce for
three days, on the condition that neither army should change its position nor
stir from where it was. Murat averred that negotiations for peace were now
proceeding, and that he proposed a truce therefore to avoid useless bloodshed.
The Austrian general, Nostits, who was in charge of the advance posts, believed
the statements of Murat's messengers and retired, leaving Bagration's detachment
unprotected. The other messengers rode off to the Russian line to make the same
announcement about peace negotiations, and to propose a truce of three days, to
the Russian troops. Bagration replied that he was not authorised to accept or to
decline a truce, and sent his adjutant to Kutuzov with a report of the
proposition made to him.

A truce gave Kutuzov the only possibility of gaining time, of letting
Bagration's exhausted forces rest, and of getting the transport and heavy
convoys (the movement of which was concealed from the French) a further stage on
their journey. The offer of a truce gave the one-and totally unexpected-chance
of saving the army. On receiving information of it, Kutuzov promptly despatched
the general-adjutant, Winzengerode, who was with him, to the enemy's camp.
Winzengerode was instructed not only to accept the truce, but to propose terms
of capitulation, while Kutuzov meanwhile sent his adjutants back to hasten to
the utmost the transport of the luggage of the whole army along the Krems and
Znaim road. Bagration's hungry and exhausted detachment alone was to cover the
movements of the transport and of the whole army, by remaining stationary in
face of an enemy eight times stronger numerically.

Kutuzov's anticipations were correct both as to the proposals of
capitulation, which bound him to nothing, giving time for part of the transport
to reach Znaim, and as to Murat's blunder being very quickly discovered. As soon
as Bonaparte, who was at Schönbrunn, only twenty-five versts from Hollabrunn,
received Murat's despatch and projects of truce and capitulation, he detected
the deception and despatched the following letter to Murat:

"NAPOLEON."

Bonaparte's adjutant dashed off at full gallop with this menacing letter to
Murat. Not trusting his generals, Bonaparte himself advanced to the field of
battle with his whole guard, fearful of letting the snared victim slip through
his fingers. Meanwhile the four thousand men of Bagration's detachment, merrily
lighting camp-fires, dried and warmed themselves, and cooked their porridge for
the first time for three days, and not one among them knew or dreamed of what
was in store for them.