Fewer big-company chief executives are leaving their posts, and CEOs face little risk of dismissal even after two years of poor shareholder returns, according to a new study.

The Booz & Co. analysis, slated for release Tuesday, suggests that corporate directors often hesitate to oust a weak leader because they lack an internal replacement, a finding that may further pressure boards to bolster management-succession planning.

Booz, a management consultancy, scrutinized CEO changes and total shareholder returns for the world's 2,500 largest publicly traded companies as measured by market capitalization in 1995, 1998, and 2000 to 2007. Global management turnover declined last year for the second consecutive year to 13.8% from 14.3%; it hit a high of 15.4% in 2005. CEOs who left last year had served a median of six years.

While fewer CEOs are leaving, more of them are being forced out of their posts. Booz said 4.2% of CEOs world-wide were forced out last year. That is slightly above the 3.8% average for this decade, and up dramatically from the 1.1% to 2% annual rates in the 1990s, according to the report.

But even poor performers still have considerable job security. CEOs whose shareholder returns fell 25% while significantly underperforming peers over two years had a 5.7% chance of being ousted the following year.

'Corporate boards are not forcing out CEOs who are delivering substandard performance for shareholders,' the study said. Amid mounting investor pressure for short-term results, this finding 'was a surprise,' said Gary L. Neilson, a Booz senior vice president and one of the report's three authors.

The conclusion didn't surprise some succession specialists, however. 'Boards don't jump to pull the trigger' over short-term returns as long as directors understand a company's strategy, major issues and industry, observed David Nadler, a senior partner at Oliver Wyman Consulting in New York.

Messrs. Nadler and Neilson both said more CEOs would be fired for poor short-term returns if boards did a better job of succession planning. Directors without an obvious replacement for their CEO often tell Mr. Nadler, 'We'll live with what we have and hope things get better.'

In another sign of insufficient succession planning, the Booz study found that North American and European boards keep hiring outsiders as CEOs 'even though they consistently underperform CEOs who rose through the ranks.' Outsiders also tend to step down sooner than insiders. For the years covered by the analysis, about 20% of the CEOs hired were outsiders.

The study suggested that boards could improve their selection of future chief executives through a comprehensive approach of identifying future leaders, giving them varied experience and moving them up through the organization.

Other factors also may influence the job security of global chief executives, the report said. CEOs who are also chairmen of the board are less likely to be ousted, the study found. And boardroom disputes and power struggles accounted for more than one-third of CEO dismissals since 2004, up from less than one-fourth in prior years. Researchers used news accounts and other outside sources to categorize boardroom disputes, and excluded financial-performance disagreements.

一项新研究显示，如今大公司的首席执行长中离职的已经越来越少，即便股东回报率连续两年表现不佳，CEO们也几乎不会有下课的危险。

管理咨询机构Booz & Co.周二公布的研究表明，公司董事在决定罢免没有能力的领导人之前往往犹豫再三，因为他们找不到合适的内部替代人选。这一研究结果也许会给董事会带来更大压力，促使他们更加重视管理层交接规划。

Booz仔细研究了1995年、1998年、2000到2007年期间，市值位列全球前2,500位的上市公司的CEO变动及总体股东回报率情况。去年全球管理层的人员流动率连续第二年下降，由14.3%降至13.8%；这一数字在2005年时达到15.4%的峰值。去年CEO的流动率为六年中值。

虽然离职的CEO人数比从前减少，但在这些离开的高管中，被罢免职务、而非主动请辞的人数比例却在增加。Booz称，去年全球范围有4.2%的CEO被"赶出"了公司，虽然这一比例只是略高于过去十年3.8%的均值，但却大大高于九十年代1.1%至2%不等的水平。

不过即便是那些碌碌无为的高管，他们的工作也相当有保证。那些所在公司的股东回报率两年内下降25%、且股票表现远不及类股的CEO们，他们在今后一年内被免职的几率也只有5.7%。

Booz研究显示，公司董事会不会强迫那些未能让回报率达到标准水平的CEO离职。Booz高级副总裁、研究报告三位作者之一的加里•尼尔逊(Gary L. Neilson)说，在如今投资者不断施压要求获得短期回报的背景下，这一结果着实"令人吃惊。"

然而上述结论在某些管理层更迭专家看来却并不意外。纽约奥纬咨询(Oliver Wyman Consulting)的高级合伙人大卫•纳德勒(David Nadler)指出，只要董事们了解公司战略、行业状况和主要问题，他们就不会过多地计较短期回报率的问题。

纳德勒和尼尔逊都谈到，如果董事会在继任安排上已做好合理规划，那么会有更多CEO因短期回报率不佳而被炒。一些还没找到CEO确定新人选的董事常常对纳德勒说，我们会继续与现任CEO合作，希望将来事情会有所改善。

Booz的另一项研究结果也表明董事会的继任筹划工作做得不够到位：他们发现北美和欧洲企业的董事会时常聘请外部人士担任公司CEO，而这些"局外人"的能力往往不及从公司内部提拔起来的CEO。此外，外部CEO的在位时间一般比内部CEO要短。Booz对上述年份的研究表明，公司聘用的CEO中约有两成来自外部。

研究指出，董事会可以事先做些准备来改善他们挑选继任CEO的工作，首先通过广泛的挑选确定一些候选人，然后给他们提供丰富的实践经验，根据各自表现在公司内部进行层层提拔。

报告显示，还有一些因素可能也会影响CEO职位的稳固性。研究发现，身兼董事长职务的CEO被罢免的几率要小一些。自2004年以来下课的CEO中，超过三分之一的CEO是董事会内部矛盾和权力纷争的牺牲品，前些年这一比例还不到四分之一。研究人员使用新闻报导以及其他外部资源来界定董事会的矛盾，而董事会在公司财务问题上的分歧不被包括在内。
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