今天起得早，准备用点功学习。上网的时候查找到环球时报的一篇报道，顺便也把英语原文找出来了。原来准备用英语原文来作为翻译练习的，但是看了一下，不合适。原因有两点，主要是文章比较简单，明显比考研翻译的文章简单多了；其次是，太政治化。但是，觉得删了又可惜了。所以，把原文和译文都贴出来。大家可以看看，当作泛读吧。
原文引自卫报，编译的译文引自环球时报。
If the 20th century ended in 1989,
the 21st began in 1978
Eleven years before the epochal events in Germany, a seismic change
was taking place in China
Martin Jacques in Beijing
Thursday May 25, 2006The
Guardian
http://www.guardian.co.uk/china/story/0,,1782531,00.html
It is, of course, common sense that 1989 was the defining
moment of the last quarter of the 20th century. Who could possibly
disagree? It closed a chapter of history that had been ushered in
by the October revolution in 1917. It brought to an end the
systemic challenge that communism had posed to capitalism, the
belief that there was, indeed, an alternative. It allowed
the United States to emerge as the undisputed superpower of a new century. It
gave globalisation access to the former Soviet bloc from which it
had been excluded: henceforth, globalisation could live up to its
name.
That is an imposing list by any standards: an
epochal event of enormous implication. But the most important event
of the late 20th century? Let me present another candidate: 1978.
What, you might ask. Why 1978? It was the year that Deng Xiaoping
introduced his open-door reforms in China , which inaugurated a quarter-century of annual
double-digit growth rates, resulting in the economic transformation
of China. Compared with 1989, 1978 was admittedly a rather
dull affair, however far-reaching its implications might have been.
But 1989, on the other hand -notwithstanding the fact that it was
bloodless and atypically good-natured - had more than a touch of
the grand European political theatre. It was recognisably in the
European revolutionary tradition. No contest there
then.
Nor did 1978 have the elevated
political meaning that attaches to 1989. The latter did not just
exude political theatre: it had substance too. It closed an era of
not just communist but also socialist history. From that moment on,
the world acquiesced in capitalism: like it or lump it, there was
no other alternative in town. The country that had carried the
hopes of a systemic alternative had collapsed amid its own
contradictions.
That is history on the grandest
scale - 1978 cannot possibly compare. A communist country chose to
turn its back on an era of egalitarianism and embrace the market.
It took the first tentative steps towards capitalism. In that
sense, interestingly, 1978 mirrored 1989, or even anticipated it.
Unlike the Soviet Communist party, the Chinese Communist party
chose to introduce capitalism. So in political terms, in the
language of grand alternatives Europeans are so partial to, 1978
cannot hold a candle to 1989.
No, the case for 1978 must be established on quite
different grounds. It involved the making of a very different kind
of history. Ever since Britain's industrial revolution began in the late 18th
century the world has been dominated by the west, namely
Europe and the US . Until well after the middle of the last century,
it was widely believed that those countries that had been on the
receiving end of European colonialism were destined for a perpetual
status of dependency and underdevelopment. The rise of east Asia
showed that not to be the case. More dramatically, the
transformation of China has decisively moved the global centre of gravity
eastwards. The 21st century will be quite unlike the preceding two
centuries, in which power was located in Europe and the US and the rest of the world consisted of mere
supplicants and bit players.
Although 1978 is still recent, we are already a
long way down the road to the creation of this very different
world. So far the process has been overwhelmingly economic.
Europe, for example, is therefore still largely
oblivious to the fact and consequences of this transformation, not
least what it will mean politically and culturally for our
continent. As a sign of our parochialism - and almost historically
coincident with the rapid rise of China - we have become increasingly obsessed with the
"Islamic problem". So long a cipher of the US, and now mired in its own travails and sense of
decline, Europe has grown myopic and introspective, a poor vantage
point from which to see the future.
In fact, we can already begin to see the broader
implications of China's transformation: its global search for oil and
other commodities; its increasingly proactive diplomatic presence
around the world, from south-east Asia and the Middle East to Africa and Latin America; and a rapidly growing nervousness in
Washington about China's emergent global role. And we are still only at
the very beginning of this process. I have been struck on this
visit to Beijing by the rapidly rising sense of self-confidence
that characterises attitudes here - the feeling that history is "on
our side".
History is proving surprisingly fleet of foot. In
the aftermath of 9/11 and in the build-up to the invasion of
Iraq, few questioned the idea that the
United States was likely to be the extant superpower for several
decades to come. Few anticipated how quickly the neoconservative
project would run into the sands - or that China would rise so quickly. The New American Century
has ended before the new century has got into its stride. The story
of this century - or the first half of it - will be the decline of
the existing superpower and the rise of a new one:
China.
The ramifications are enormous. Power will no
longer be located primarily in the west. The assumptions that
inform global discourse will cease to be overwhelmingly western.
History will no longer be written with a hugely western bias.
Chinese interests, history, values, attitudes and prejudices will
become familiar to us all. Perhaps all of this does not lie so far
in the future as we might think. In his speech at
Yale University on his recent visit to the US, Hu Jintao, the Chinese president, talked of
Chinese values and what they have to offer the world. Here
in Beijing one can detect a growing confidence in a more
assertive argument about the achievements and merits of the Chinese
Communist party.
So what, then, of the argument
concerning 1989 and 1978? Perhaps we should, indeed, see 1989 as
the epochal book end of the 20th century, the event that brought it
all to a close. And - with a little historicallicence - we should
regard 1978 more properly as marking the beginning of the 21st
century, the event that ushered in a new epoch, though barely
anyone could possibly have realised it at the time. It is worth
remembering, too, that 1989 was first and foremost a European
event, probably the last great global event that was also European
that we will witness for a very long time to come. Of course, 1978
was a purely Chinese moment, albeit with huge global ramifications.
What could be a more eloquentsummary of their respective places in
history?
原文引自卫报，编译的译文引自环球时报。
If the 20th century ended in 1989,
the 21st began in 1978
Eleven years before the epochal events in Germany, a seismic change
was taking place in China
Martin Jacques in Beijing
Thursday May 25, 2006The
Guardian
http://www.guardian.co.uk/china/story/0,,1782531,00.html
It is, of course, common sense that 1989 was the defining
moment of the last quarter of the 20th century. Who could possibly
disagree? It closed a chapter of history that had been ushered in
by the October revolution in 1917. It brought to an end the
systemic challenge that communism had posed to capitalism, the
belief that there was, indeed, an alternative. It allowed
the United States to emerge as the undisputed superpower of a new century. It
gave globalisation access to the former Soviet bloc from which it
had been excluded: henceforth, globalisation could live up to its
name.
That is an imposing list by any standards: an
epochal event of enormous implication. But the most important event
of the late 20th century? Let me present another candidate: 1978.
What, you might ask. Why 1978? It was the year that Deng Xiaoping
introduced his open-door reforms in China , which inaugurated a quarter-century of annual
double-digit growth rates, resulting in the economic transformation
of China. Compared with 1989, 1978 was admittedly a rather
dull affair, however far-reaching its implications might have been.
But 1989, on the other hand -notwithstanding the fact that it was
bloodless and atypically good-natured - had more than a touch of
the grand European political theatre. It was recognisably in the
European revolutionary tradition. No contest there
then.
Nor did 1978 have the elevated
political meaning that attaches to 1989. The latter did not just
exude political theatre: it had substance too. It closed an era of
not just communist but also socialist history. From that moment on,
the world acquiesced in capitalism: like it or lump it, there was
no other alternative in town. The country that had carried the
hopes of a systemic alternative had collapsed amid its own
contradictions.
That is history on the grandest
scale - 1978 cannot possibly compare. A communist country chose to
turn its back on an era of egalitarianism and embrace the market.
It took the first tentative steps towards capitalism. In that
sense, interestingly, 1978 mirrored 1989, or even anticipated it.
Unlike the Soviet Communist party, the Chinese Communist party
chose to introduce capitalism. So in political terms, in the
language of grand alternatives Europeans are so partial to, 1978
cannot hold a candle to 1989.
No, the case for 1978 must be established on quite
different grounds. It involved the making of a very different kind
of history. Ever since Britain's industrial revolution began in the late 18th
century the world has been dominated by the west, namely
Europe and the US . Until well after the middle of the last century,
it was widely believed that those countries that had been on the
receiving end of European colonialism were destined for a perpetual
status of dependency and underdevelopment. The rise of east Asia
showed that not to be the case. More dramatically, the
transformation of China has decisively moved the global centre of gravity
eastwards. The 21st century will be quite unlike the preceding two
centuries, in which power was located in Europe and the US and the rest of the world consisted of mere
supplicants and bit players.
Although 1978 is still recent, we are already a
long way down the road to the creation of this very different
world. So far the process has been overwhelmingly economic.
Europe, for example, is therefore still largely
oblivious to the fact and consequences of this transformation, not
least what it will mean politically and culturally for our
continent. As a sign of our parochialism - and almost historically
coincident with the rapid rise of China - we have become increasingly obsessed with the
"Islamic problem". So long a cipher of the US, and now mired in its own travails and sense of
decline, Europe has grown myopic and introspective, a poor vantage
point from which to see the future.
In fact, we can already begin to see the broader
implications of China's transformation: its global search for oil and
other commodities; its increasingly proactive diplomatic presence
around the world, from south-east Asia and the Middle East to Africa and Latin America; and a rapidly growing nervousness in
Washington about China's emergent global role. And we are still only at
the very beginning of this process. I have been struck on this
visit to Beijing by the rapidly rising sense of self-confidence
that characterises attitudes here - the feeling that history is "on
our side".
History is proving surprisingly fleet of foot. In
the aftermath of 9/11 and in the build-up to the invasion of
Iraq, few questioned the idea that the
United States was likely to be the extant superpower for several
decades to come. Few anticipated how quickly the neoconservative
project would run into the sands - or that China would rise so quickly. The New American Century
has ended before the new century has got into its stride. The story
of this century - or the first half of it - will be the decline of
the existing superpower and the rise of a new one:
China.
The ramifications are enormous. Power will no
longer be located primarily in the west. The assumptions that
inform global discourse will cease to be overwhelmingly western.
History will no longer be written with a hugely western bias.
Chinese interests, history, values, attitudes and prejudices will
become familiar to us all. Perhaps all of this does not lie so far
in the future as we might think. In his speech at
Yale University on his recent visit to the US, Hu Jintao, the Chinese president, talked of
Chinese values and what they have to offer the world. Here
in Beijing one can detect a growing confidence in a more
assertive argument about the achievements and merits of the Chinese
Communist party.
So what, then, of the argument
concerning 1989 and 1978? Perhaps we should, indeed, see 1989 as
the epochal book end of the 20th century, the event that brought it
all to a close. And - with a little historicallicence - we should
regard 1978 more properly as marking the beginning of the 21st
century, the event that ushered in a new epoch, though barely
anyone could possibly have realised it at the time. It is worth
remembering, too, that 1989 was first and foremost a European
event, probably the last great global event that was also European
that we will witness for a very long time to come. Of course, 1978
was a purely Chinese moment, albeit with huge global ramifications.
What could be a more eloquentsummary of their respective places in
history?
- challenge [´tʃælindʒ]
n.&vt.向....挑战；怀疑 (初中英语单词) - emerge [i´mə:dʒ] vi.出现；显露；暴露 (初中英语单词)
- soviet [´səuviit] a.苏联的 n.苏维埃 (初中英语单词)
- henceforth [´hens´fɔ:θ] ad.今后；从今以后 (初中英语单词)
- enormous [i´nɔ:məs] a.巨大地，很，极 (初中英语单词)
- candidate [´kændideit] n.候选人；投考者 (初中英语单词)
- european [juərə´pi:ən] a.欧洲的 n.欧洲人 (初中英语单词)
- tradition [trə´diʃən] n.传统；惯例；传说 (初中英语单词)
- contest [kən´test, ´kɔntest] v.争辩 n.争夺；竞赛 (初中英语单词)
- embrace [im´breis] vt.&n.拥抱；采纳；信奉 (初中英语单词)
- industrial [in´dʌstriəl] a.工业的，产业的 (初中英语单词)
- unlike [,ʌn´laik] a.不同的 prep.不象... (初中英语单词)
- creation [kri´eiʃən] n.创作；作品；创造 (初中英语单词)
- therefore [´ðeəfɔ:] ad.&conj.因此；所以 (初中英语单词)
- beginning [bi´giniŋ] n.开始，开端；起源 (初中英语单词)
- western [´westən] a.西的；西方的 (初中英语单词)
- argument [´ɑ:gjumənt] n.辩论；争论；论证 (初中英语单词)
- licence [´laisəns] n.许可；执照 vt.批准 (初中英语单词)
- properly [´prɔpəli] ad.适当地；严格地 (初中英语单词)
- witness [´witnis] n.见证人 vt.目击 (初中英语单词)
- purely [´pjuəli] ad.仅仅；简单地 (初中英语单词)
- communism [´kɔmjunizəm] n.共产主义 (高中英语单词)
- access [´ækses] n.接近；通路；进入 (高中英语单词)
- revolutionary [,revə´lu:ʃənəri] a.革命的 n.革命者 (高中英语单词)
- communist [´kɔmjunist] n.共产主义者 (高中英语单词)
- socialist [´səuʃəlist] n.社会主义者 (高中英语单词)
- invasion [in´veiʒən] n.入侵；侵害；侵犯 (高中英语单词)
- stride [straid] n.进展 v.跨过；骑 (高中英语单词)
- discourse [´diskɔ:s] n.论文；演说；说教 (高中英语单词)
- detect [di´tekt] vt.发觉；侦察 (高中英语单词)
- historical [his´tɔrikəl] a.历史(上)的 (高中英语单词)
- foremost [´fɔ:məust] a.最重要的；最先的 (高中英语单词)
- alternative [ɔ:l´tə:nətiv] a.二中选一的 n.选择 (英语四级单词)
- good-natured [´gud-´neitʃəd] a.脾气好的，温厚的 (英语四级单词)
- partial [´pɑ:ʃəl] a.部分的；偏袒的 (英语四级单词)
- preceding [pri(:)´si:diŋ] a.在先的；前面的 (英语四级单词)
- transformation [,trænsfə´meiʃən] n.转化；转变；改造 (英语四级单词)
- increasingly [in´kri:siŋli] ad.日益，愈加 (英语四级单词)
- diplomatic [,diplə´mætik] a.外交的 (英语四级单词)
- primarily [´praimərəli, prai´merəli] ad.首先；主要地 (英语四级单词)
- eloquent [´eləkwənt] a.流利的；雄辩的 (英语四级单词)
- summary [´sʌməri] a.&n.摘要(的) (英语四级单词)
- respective [ri´spektiv] a.各自的，各个的 (英语四级单词)
- taking [´teikiŋ] a.迷人的 n.捕获物 (英语六级单词)
- capitalism [´kæpitəlizəm] n.资本主义 (英语六级单词)
- imposing [im´pəuziŋ] a.壮丽的，堂皇的 (英语六级单词)
- implication [,impli´keiʃən] n.牵过；暗示；含蓄 (英语六级单词)
- far-reaching [fɑ:´ri:tʃiŋ] a.影响远大的；深远的 (英语六级单词)
- surprisingly [sə´praiziŋli] ad.惊人地；意外地 (英语六级单词)
- herein [,hiər´in] ad.在此，鉴于 (英语六级单词)
- albeit [ɔ:l´bi:it] conj.即使；纵使；虽然 (英语六级单词)
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