《War And Peace》　Book14 　CHAPTER II
　　　　by Leo Tolstoy

ONE of the most conspicuous and advantageous departures from the so-called
rules of warfare is the independent action of men acting separately against men
huddled together in a mass. Such independent activity is always seen in a war
that assumes a national character. In this kind of warfare, instead of forming
in a crowd to attack a crowd, men disperse in small groups, attack singly and at
once fly, when attacked by superior forces, and then attack again, when an
opportunity presents itself. Such were the methods of the guerillas in Spain; of
the mountain tribes in the Caucasus, and of the Russians in 1812.

War of this kind has been called partisanwarfare on the supposition that
this name defined its special significance. But this kind of warfare does not
follow any rules of war, but is in direct contradiction to a well-known rule of
tactics, regarded as infallible. That rule lays it down that the attacking party
must concentrate his forces in order to be stronger than his opponent at the
moment of conflict.

Partisan warfare (always successful, as history testifies) acts in direct
contradiction of this rule.

Military science assumes that the relative strength of forces is identical
with their numerical proportions. Military science maintains that the greater
the number of soldiers, the greater their strength. Les gros bataillons ont
toujours raison.

To say this is as though one were in mechanics to say that forces were equal
or unequal simply because the masses of the moving bodies were equal or
unequal.

Force (the volume of motion) is the product of the mass into the
velocity.

In warfare the force of armies is the product of the mass multiplied by
something else, an unknown x.

Military science, seeing in history an immense number of examples in which
the mass of an army does not correspond with its force, and in which small
numbers conquer large ones, vaguely recognises the existence of this unknown
factor, and tries to find it sometimes in some geometrical disposition of the
troops, sometimes in the superiority of weapons, and most often in the genius of
the leaders. But none of those factors yield results that agree with the
historical facts.

One has but to renounce the false view that glorifies the effect of the
activity of the heroes of history in warfare in order to discover this unknown
quantity, x.

X is the spirit of the army, the greater or less desire to fight and
to face dangers on the part of all the men composing the army, which is quite
apart from the question whether they are fighting under leaders of genius or
not, with cudgels or with guns that fire thirty times a minute. The men who have
the greater desire to fight always put themselves, too, in the more advantageous
position for fighting. The spirit of the army is the factor which multiplied by
the mass gives the product of the force. To define and express the significance
of this unknown factor, the spirit of the army, is the problem of science.

This problem can only be solved when we cease arbitrarily substituting for
that unknown factor x the conditions under which the force is manifested,
such as the plans of the general, the arming of the men and so on, and recognise
this unknown factor in its entirety as the greater or less desire to fight and
face danger. Then only by expressing known historical facts in equations can one
hope from comparison of the relative value of this unknown factor to approach
its definition. Ten men, or battalions or divisions are victorious fighting with
fifteen men or battalions or divisions, that is, they kill or take prisoner all
of them while losing four of their own side, so that the loss has been four on
one side and fifteen on the other. Consequently, four on one side have been
equivalent to fifteen on the other, and consequently 4x = 15y.
Consequently x/y = 15/4. This equation does not give us the value of the
unknown factors, but it does give us the ratio between their values. And from
the reduction to such equations of various historical units (battles, campaigns,
periods of warfare) a series of numbers are obtained, in which there must be and
may be discovered historical laws.

The strategic principle, that armies should act in masses on the offensive,
and should break up into smaller groups for retreat, unconsciously confirms the
truth that the force of an army depends on its spirit. To lead men forward under
fire needs more discipline (which can only be attained by marching in masses)
than is needed for self-defence when attacked. But this rule, which leaves out
of sight the spirit of the army, is continually proving unsound, and is
strikingly untrue in practice in all national wars, when there is a great rise
or fall in the spirit of the armies.

The French, on their retreat in 1812, though they should, by the laws of
tactics, have defended themselves in detached groups, huddled together in a
crowd, because the spirit of the men had sunk so low that it was only their
number that kept them up. The Russians should, on the contrary, by the laws of
tactics, have attacked them in a mass, but in fact attacked in scattered
companies, because the spirit of the men ran so high that individual men killed
the French without orders, and needed no compulsion to face hardships and
dangers.