《War And Peace》　Book13 　CHAPTER III
　　　　by Leo Tolstoy

THE RUSSIAN ARMY was commanded by Kutuzov and his staff and by the Tsar from
Petersburg. Before the news of the abandonment of Moscow had reached Petersburg
a detailed plan of the whole campaign had been drawn up and sent to Kutuzov for
his guidance. In spite of the fact that this plan had been made on the
supposition that Moscow was still in our hands, it was approved by the staff,
and accepted as the plan to be carried out. Kutuzov simply wrote that directions
from a distance were always difficult to carry out. And to solve any
difficulties that might arise, fresh instructions were sent, together with newer
persons, whose duty it was to be to keep a watch on his movements, and to report
upon them.

Apart from these new authorities, the whole staff of generals in the Russian
army was now transferred. The places of Bagration, who had been killed, and
Barclay, who had taken offence and retired, had to be filled. The question was
deliberated with the greatest seriousness: whether A should be put in B's place,
and B in the place of D, or whether, on the other hand, D in A's place, and so
on, as though the matter affected anything whatever except the satisfaction of A
and B and D.

In consequence of Kutuzov's hostility to the head officer of his staff,
Bennigsen, and the presence of confidential advisers of the Tsar, and these
various new appointments, the struggle of parties at headquarters was even more
complicated than usual. A was trying to undermine B's position, D to undermine
C's position, and so on, in all the possible combinations and permutations. In
all these conflicting currents the object of intrigue was for the most part the
management of the war, which all these men supposed they were controlling,
though it did, in fact, follow its inevitable course quite apart from their
action, a course that never corresponded with their schemes, but was the outcome
of the forces interacting in the masses. All these schemes, thwarting and
stultifying one another, were simply accepted in the higher spheres as the
correct reflection of what was bound to come to pass.

"Prince Mihail Ilarionovitch!" the Tsar wrote on the 2nd of October, a letter
received by Kutuzov after the battle of Tarutino. "From the 2nd of September
Moscow has been in the hands of the enemy. Your last reports were dated the
20th; and in the course of all this time since, no attempt has been made to act
against the enemy, and to relieve the ancient capital, and you have even, from
your last reports, retreated further. Serpuhov is by now occupied by a
detachment of the enemy, and Tula, with its famous arsenal, of such importance
to the army, is in danger. From the reports received from General Wintzengerode,
I see that a corps of the enemy, ten thousand strong, is marching along the
Petersburg road. Another, numbering some thousands, is already close upon
Dmitrov. A third is advancing along the Vladimir road. A fourth force of
considerable strength is stationed between Ruza and Mozhaisk. Napoleon himself
was in Moscow on the 25th. In face of these facts, with the enemy's forces split
up into these detached bodies, and Napoleon himself with his guards in Moscow,
is it possible that the enemy's forces confronting you are too strong to permit
of your acting on the offensive? One may, with far more probability, assume that
you are being pursued by detachments, or at most a corps by far inferior to the
army under your command. It would seem that taking advantage of these
circumstances, you might with advantage have attacked forces inferior in
strength to your army, and have destroyed them, or at least have forced them to
retreat, and have kept in our hands a considerable part of the province now
occupied by the enemy, and thereby have averted all danger from Tula and the
other towns of the interior. You will be responsible, if the enemy is able to
send a considerable body of men to Petersburg, to menace that capital, in which
it has been impossible to keep any great number of troops; for with the army
under your command, acting with energy and decision, you have ample means at
your disposal for averting such a calamity. Recollect that you have still to
answer to your humiliated country for the loss of Moscow. You have had
experience of my readiness to reward you. That readiness is no less now, but
Russia and I have the right to expect from you all the energy, decision, and
success, which your intellect, your military talents, and the valour of the
troops under your command should guarantee us."

But while this letter, proving that the change in the relative strength of
the armies was by now reflected in opinion at Petersburg, was on its road,
Kutuzov had been unable to hold the army back, and a battle had already been
fought.

On the 2nd of October, a Cossack, Shapovalov, out scouting, shot one hare and
wounded a second. Shapovalov was led on in pursuit of the game far into the
forest, and came across the left flank of Murat's army, which was encamped and
quite off guard. The Cossack told his comrades with laughter the tale of how he
had all but fallen into the hands of the French. The ensign, who heard the
story, repeated it to his superior officer. The Cossack was sent for and
questioned. The officers of the Cossacks wanted to take advantage of this to
carry off some horses from the French, but one of them, who was intimate with
some of the higher authorities in the army, mentioned the incident to a general
on the staff. On the staff the position of late had been strained to the utmost.
A few days previously, Yermolov had gone to Bennigsen and besought him to use
his influence with the commander-in-chief to bring about an attack.

"If I did not know you, I should suppose you did not desire that result. I
have only to advise one course for his highness to be sure to adopt the opposite
one," answered Bennigsen.

The news brought by the Cossack, confirmed by scouts, proved conclusively
that the time was ripe. The strained string broke, and the wheels of the clock
whirred, and the chimes began to strike. In spite of all his supposed power, his
intellect, his experience, and his knowledge of men, Kutuzov, taking into
consideration the note from Bennigsen, who was sending a personal report on the
subject to the Tsar, the desire expressed by all the generals alike, the desire
assumed by them to be the Tsar's wish, and the news brought by the Cossack,
could hold back the inevitable movement no longer, and gave orders for what he
regarded as useless and mischievous-gave his assent, in fact, to the
accomplished fact.