The Chutzpah of Goldman Sachs
Mean Street: The Chutzpah of Goldman Sachs
You have to admire Lloyd Blankfein's nerve.
Goldman's
yearly profit is down more than 80%. Its shares are down about 70%. It has been forced to accept
billions in capital from Warren Buffett and, of all indignities, Washington D.C.
And Blankfein has just paid the average Goldman employee about $395,000 ─ nearly eight times what the American median household earns in a year.
But that's not the nervy thing. It's that in a year when Wall Street has utterly destroyed itself, Blankfein sees no need to change the Goldman business model.
That's what even Bernie Madoff might call chutzpah.
First, to the issue of pay. The
perception of Goldman's management and Wall Street analysts will be that Goldman was "tough but fair" on year-end bonuses.
After all, didn't Goldman's
senior executives
forfeit any 2008 bonuses? And didn't Goldman's comp expense fall from over $20
billion in 2007 to under $11
billion this year? And won't bonuses for many at Goldman be down 40% or 50%?
But these bonuses are marked down from 2007, a record year for Wall Street. The "average" Goldman employee will still receive almost $400,000 in comp and benefits. And hundreds of bankers and traders at Goldman will still pocket multi-million dollar pay packages.
This should not be a surprise. Wall Street bankers, shareholders and the analyst
community expect high
compensation ─ annus horribilis or not. Washington politicians may carry on, but this is the way the "free market" works.
It was funny to listen to the discussion of bonuses on the
investor conference call with Goldman CFO David Viniar. One analyst fretted "are they happy?" when inquiring about the morale of Goldman's ranks.
And when another analyst opined that a 48% comp to net
revenue ratio seemed at the high end given this year's utter financial destruction, Viniar shot back that Goldman paid a lower ratio than its Wall Street competitors.
Forget that most of these competitors don't exist anymore. But this is
classic Wall Street thinking. Senior execs
target comp at close to 50% of net
revenues because that's what's worked well in the past.
It hasn't
necessarily worked well for shareholders ─ but that's another matter.
The 50% comp
target is symptomatic of Goldman's current "no change to the business model" mindset.
Goldman's view is that it is the victim of
rotten markets. And that's understandable ─ because the markets have been
rotten, especially for any institution forced to mark assets to market and delever a trillion dollar balance sheet at the same time.
Bear, Lehman and Merrill Lynch couldn't manage it. But Goldman certainly did. In fact, it turned a profit in 2008. Did anybody else?
So as Lloyd Blankfein surveys the new Wall Street. He sees a lot less competition. He sees depression-level markets that will probably rebound from their lows. He sees commercial banks that will be buried in
consumer loan and
mortgage writedowns.
And he knows that greed can quickly replace the fear and
outrage that now grips the minds of
investors.
So maybe Blankfein thinks with some
justification: Why should I change the business model? Why shouldn't I pay my people? And how quickly can I repay the loan from the Treasury to get Washington off my back?
Blankfein might just convince the market of Goldman's business model. Despite the lousy results, Goldman shares closed up 14% today at $76. Funnily enough ─ that's the same price as the high for Goldman's shares on the first day of its IPO in 1999.
Perhaps Blankfein can laugh at the irony, but I'm not sure too many of his shareholders would.
你不得不佩服高盛集团(Goldman Sachs)董事长罗伊德•布兰克芬(Lloyd Blankfein)的勇气。
高盛上一财年收益下滑了超过80%,股价下跌了大约70%。这家华尔街巨头已经被迫接受
巴菲特(Warren Buffett)的数十亿美元注资,还要遭受来自华盛顿的贬损。
而布兰克芬却刚刚向高盛员工支付了人均大约39.5万美元的奖金,几乎是美国家庭年收入中值的八倍。
但这还不能体现他坚强的神经。真正勇敢的是,在华尔街经历了自我毁灭的一年后,布兰克芬却认为没有必要改变高盛的业务模式。
哪怕是马多夫(Bernie Madoff)可能也会说他放肆吧。
首先来看薪酬的问题。高盛管理层和华尔街分析师的观点是,高盛在年终奖金的问题上"严格又公道"。
毕竟,高盛的高管们已经丧失了2008年的奖金,高盛的薪酬支出也从2007年的超过200亿美元下滑到今年的不到110亿美元,许多员工的奖金会少40%或50%。
不过,这些奖金数目只是低于2007年,那是华尔街薪酬创纪录的一年。高盛普通员工仍然可获得将近40万美元的补偿和福利。高盛银行部门和交易部门的数百名员工照样可以入帐数百万美元。
这应该不奇怪。华尔街的银行家、股东和分析师们都期望高收入──不管是不是糟糕的一年。华盛顿的政客们可能会觉得不爽,但这就是"自由市场"的运转方式。
听高盛首席财务长大卫•维尼亚(David Viniar)在投资者电话会议上讨论奖金问题真是有趣。一位分析师问到高盛员工士气的时候还担心地问"他们觉得开心么?"
另一位分析师认为,鉴于今年财务状况如此糟糕,高盛员工薪酬占净收入比例达到48%似乎过高了。维尼亚随即反驳,称高盛的薪酬占收入比例可是低于华尔街竞争对手的。
别管这些竞争对手大多数都已不复存在。这是典型的华尔街思维方式。高管们打算把将近半数的净收入拿来发奖金,是因为这种模式过去行之有效。
这一模式对股东来说却不见得有效──但这是另一档事了。
坚持50%的薪酬比例是高盛当前"不改变业务模式"思维的典型特症。
高盛认为自己是恶劣市场环境的受害者。这是可以理解的,因为市场形势的确恶劣;对那些不得不以市值标注资产价值,同时又要为上亿美元资产负债表去杠杆的金融机构来说,日子尤其不好过。
贝尔斯登、雷曼兄弟和美林公司(Merrill Lynch)都没能挺过来。但高盛却无疑做到了。实际上,高盛今年还实现了盈利。还有哪家公司能做到?
布兰克芬在考量新华尔街的时候也是这么想的。他看到竞争会大为减少,处于衰退的市场可能会从低点反弹,商业银行或将因消费者贷款和抵押贷款冲销而崩塌。
他也清楚贪婪会迅速取代现在笼罩在投资者心头的恐惧和愤怒。
因此,布兰克芬可能有理由这么想:我为什么要改变业务模式,我干嘛不给手下的人发奖金?我能多快偿清财政部的贷款,摆脱华盛顿的监督?
布兰克芬或许还真令市场信服了高盛的业务模式。尽管业绩表现黯淡,但高盛股价周二反而上涨了14%,报收于76美元。有意思的是,这正是高盛1999年上市首日的股价。
或许布兰克芬可以对这一讽刺一笑置之,但我不知道高盛的诸多股东是否也能笑的出来。
关键字:
财经新闻生词表: